Maximos, The Theory of the Leisure Class: Application and Illustration

Thorsten Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (GB, Gutenberg)

What is Veblen's paradigm, which explains his use of the term "barbarian" describing societies "in which a dominant class expropriates some portion of the production of society, rules over the productive segment of the population, and legitimates its status by elaborating myths according to which this idle exploitation is somehow finer and more noble than actually doing stuff"? How would he apply this name to the classical world?

Maximos, Notes on Nostalgia

Memory should be in the service of friendship and genuine community--we remember what others have done for us and what we owe, but also the joys (and sorrows) we experience with our friends. What is the object of nostalgia? Something that is tied to illusion or falsehood in some way, I would think. (If there is true nostalgia, for example, for the place where we grew up, then it seems to be the same as memory. But we are talking about nostalgia that is a distortion of memory.)

Jeff Martin, Omnibus Response to Various Issues Raised by My Post on a Dessicated Conception of Property Rights

Jeff Martin, Notes On the Dessicated Conception of Property Rights Prevalent in America, with Reference to Development

The character of American development is influenced by another factor, which dovetails with many of the discrete trends that comprise the cycle of suburban expansion and collapse. Americans have come to possess a dessicated and abstract conception of property, according to which property is no longer understood, or at best decreasingly understood, to be associated with place and its ties, or with productivity, or the stability of a family, but as a speculative instrument in which one happens to dwell. The concern of Americans for the rights of property is increasingly, as revealed in the fact of the real-estate bubble itself, with the exchange value of property, the opportunity to realize speculative returns on the anticipated or projected appreciation of the property conceived of as an asset. This is not the right of property invoked by the plaintiffs in Kelo, which was the right of simple possession, with the implication that their property ought not be taken and ceded to others; this is a position more nearly analogous to that of the wealthy interests to whom the Kelo plaintiffs' property was given: greater exchange value can be realized in this manner, and this fact is the paramount consideration both as between competing rights-claims, and between competing conceptions of the good. In the case of the Wal-Mart, and any adjacent property owners who might suffer a loss of exchange value were the preservationists to triumph, the claim is that a claim-right to this greater exchange value would be infringed were the development to be foreclosed. There is no consideration of property owners being stripped of the possession of their tracts, merely the contemplation of actions which will either prevent certain sales, or exclude certain uses, thus, possibly, lowering the value of the properties as speculative vehicles. And these two conceptions of property must not be treated as equivalents, either in thought or in law (and yes, law is often quite independent of thought, hence the formulation), for such speculative gains are at once inherently uncertain, depending upon both zoning and other decisions, and economic trends which cannot be foreseen, and less secure than the goods of actual possession. A property owner may whinge that a zoning restriction constitutes a "taking" because it deprives him of some hoped-for future return, but the eventual reality of such a return, if it is ever to materialize, is dependent upon broader economic trends - the sustainability of the economics of growth and consumerist expansion - that are not in evidence and cannot be regarded as certain. Moreover, it is grotesquely invidious to maintain that this expectation of future gains of exchange value be made the paramount objective of public authority, that it is mandatory, de facto for a government entity, in the course of its efforts to balance competing goods with a view to the common good - goods including the historic and aesthetic character of a region, or the quality of life afforded by not having interminable sprawl - to take care that hypothetical future exchange values are not infringed by efforts to maintain other goods, goods less amenable to quantification. It is, however, the belief in a right to 'cash out' a property held speculatively, taking advantage of the aforementioned cycles of development, that both mandates this privileging and perpetuates the wasteful utilization of a finite resource.

Maximos has intimated that paleoconservatives, Dr. Fleming in particular, are guilty of a kind of nihilism. This criticism of Dr. Fleming is shared by others over at WWWTW, so I'm a bit dismayed by the name-calling among "conservatives." Just because Dr. Fleming does not share the same political "advocacy" (since he does not think the solutions and measures being advocated are feasible, or agree with the underlying principles) does not mean that he is a nihilist. It's a difference of opinion about what is possible and what can be brought about as a result, and what therefore deserves out time, energy, and support.

What is the possible basis of agreement in American society over sexual morality and life issues? Not religion or natural law arguments. There is no rational consensus to be achieved, no argumentation or rhetoric that will persuade. Justifying opposition to the legal recognition of same-sex marriages through natural law morality will not be successful due to the lack of education (both moral and intellectual) among the masses. (There are differences even among Natural Law theorists which would probably serve as an obstacle to the non-adherent.)

Politics has thus become a power play, with the majority determining what the laws will be. A neutral "liberal democratic" state, governed by a "neutral" public reason is simply not possible given the fallen state of mankind and the loss of tradition and morals.

I think Dr. Fleming's lesson is being missed: when all of society is infected with, careful with giving more power to the state, even if one must seek to use the system to prevent further erosions of traditional morality and the common good. Perhaps he could have been more clear in his column, but it is more a blog than a journal, is it not?

Maximos writes:

It is far from clear that the opponents of the deconstruction of marriage law are actually arguing, as a substantive matter, that moral principles should be determined by public and democratic processes, as opposed to making the procedural point that, under the systems of law we have in this country, the judicial branches are not licitly empowered to legislate on these questions.

Even if traditional conservatives are successful in passing legislation that is in accordance with their moral precepts, relying on numbers may not work in the future, and the use of majoritarian democracy to decide morality is a bad idea in principle (Dr. Fleming: "What I am objecting to is the blanket assumption that moral questions can be settled by an appeal to the principle of majority rule. Our goal should be to protect what we have left of our moral traditions from the intrusion of government, and therefore we should be very chary about appealing to the state and federal courts, if only because they gain power from every appeal–like the SciFi monsters that gain strength from attacks on them.") To what, then, can we appeal if the numbers are in favor of recognizing same-sex marriages, and such legislation is passed licitly by the legislative authority?

This is especially true if the number of Christians in this country is decreasing, as a recent survey seems to indicate.

So those who are concerned with protecting tradition must be politically involved in some way -- either pushing for legislation they favor (laws in conformity with traditional morality) or advocating for controls on the state. What is our primary goal in the political sphere? Dr. Fleming and others believe that tradition cannot win in such a social and political environment--the ideology of rights will be used to overturn traditional morality, strengthening court and government. Even if some notion of right can be reconciled with traditional Natural Law (and Dr. Fleming does not think it has been, though perhaps he might be open to its demonstration), how many people will remain attentive while we explain to them why their notion of right is wrong, and that ours is right? Wouldn't they rather rely upon their notion of right and its associations, divorced as they are from justice and duty and community?

(Some object to the use of rights language by the popes for similar reasons--how many can read such statements within their context, rather than with their own notions in mind and seeing papal affirmations of rights as a confirmation of modern rights theories?)

Dr. Fleming's proposal involves working for limiting the power of the state -- hence, the strategic alliance between paleoconservatives and paleolibertarians in the past. We saw this at work again with Ron Paul's campaign, but one fears that the number of people who actually want the government to have less power is small, while those who endorse the managerial welfare state are many and grow with each day as the economic crisis continues.

He advocates limiting state 'authority,' while seeking the conversion of others. Mobilizing those who abide by traditional morality to be politically active and to push for laws with which they agree is not enough, if it's just about numbers -- many have already commented that the passing of proposition 8 in California, even if it is upheld by the California Supreme Court, is a temporary victory. The youth are increasingly indoctrinated into sexual liberality and have no problems with same-sex marriage, and are repulsed by the strictures of traditional morality. If we can make a valid generalization about the state of things in America, the culture wars have already been lost.

Dr. Fleming concedes that such political action may be necessary, but one must ultimately reform society by seeking to bring others to Christ. If this is not done, political action can only be a stop-gap measure. Some groups of Christians may be reproducing more than their secular counterparts, but many of them are not doing a good job of reproducing Christians--that is, of raising their children to be serious about their faith, because they themselves do not provide a full witness to their Faith. As American continues its decline, we can no longer believe that America is populated by a "moral majority" that can no longer afford to be silent.

Are there some conservatives who think that winning elections is enough? Or believe that, conversely, the problem is merely a political one, of not having enough votes? Undoubtedly there are. The culture war may be a tool by the parties to gain and maintain power, especially in the case of the Republicans. Not a few Democrats actually believe in their radical libertinism.

Maximos argues that limiting the power of the state, instead of advancing the right sort of legislation, would leave voluntarism as the public orthodoxy intact:

Without desiring to belabour the point, this is, notwithstanding its historical truth in outline, purely hieroglyphic, in the Voegelinian sense of a form of discourse which somehow marches onward even though its historical, social, and material conditions have been espied by Minerva's owl in the shades of night: Where once this discourse evoked concrete social circumstances, it now evokes nothing at all, save the desire of some to both acknowledge reality and pretend that it is something other than it is. For while Fleming acknowledges the reality of the modern managerial state and its deformations of the moral life, it is fantastical to imagine that, if only we were to expose the nakedness of this idol, returning to our non-existent communities to undertake the impossibility of enforcing moral norms upon people who, in liberal society, will always have the option of checking out, like good voluntarists, whenever their whims are thwarted, the reality of the managerial state would somehow be altered. No, it wouldn't. The de facto moral orthodoxy would be that marriage is a purely private, voluntaristic contract, which the state either recognizes as such or takes no notice of, and those who dissent from this vision of (dis)order would be but one more voluntaristic faction among others, paradoxically creating themselves socially as people who do not believe that social formations are artifacts of will. The liberal/leftist doctrine that moral order and social order are artifacts of will would remain pristine in its operations, functionally the de facto orthodoxy of the society. However, the elect would at least remain untainted by the ontological evil of The State - if, that is, The State deigned to leave them to their conventicles, which it wouldn't. There is, in the end, an atmosphere of despair here, a sense, not that a mere political campaign is fruitless, but that an entire life-world must be hastened to its ultimate desolation, regardless of the consequences in the interim - which will be, beyond all caviling, the indefinite enthronement of a voluntaristic ethic and a state predicated upon that ethic, as upon an orthodoxy.

Maximos is making the case that since ecclesiastical authority is no longer recognized, only political authority can now enforce traditional mores. Otherwise, without resistance and reform, that authority will be used against those mores--it would not be content to leave alone those who dissent from the prevailing public orthodoxy.

But what is more likely to be attainable? A defense of Christian morality through laws, or the reduction of the power of the state? If those who are in power wish to eradicate traditional [Christian] morals and persecute those who follow them, they will do so--it seems to me that at the Federal level at least there are not enough votes to put defenders of traditional morals into office to make a difference, or to even force the Federal government to abide by the Constitution.

An view opposed to Dr. Fleming: Jennifer Roback Morse: Privatizing Marriage is not the Answer to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate

An interesting post about Burke: Edmund Burke, Anarcho-Conservative (via the Western Confucian).

Maximos, Liberalism, Abortion, and Natural Law - Following Up (He also links to this piece by John Zmirak: The Pentagon is a Money Toilet.)

Maximos, Which Freedom

Which Freedom?

more on political economy and economic liberalism