Or is it worthwhile, but not to the degree that one might think?
There are limitations to what we can do in writing history; a complete history can never be written--that kind of knowledge is possible only with God. Human history, because of the limitations of the human mind (both on the part of the historian and on the part of the reader), must focus on the important people and ignore the contributions of those who are less important.
I can't go into the rise of history as an academic discipline, but I will say something of the attempt to make it "scientific" in the 19th century, from an Aristotelian point of view. (To be investigated--what was the sort of ideology [or philosophy] supporting this push to transform history into a science? What sort of epistemology supports the attempt to turn history into a science?)
The certitude characteristic of scientia or episteme can not be attained by history, since first of all history deals with contingent events that could have been otherwise. Moreover, for the most part one reasons from secondary evidence, and not from sense observation. (And even if one reasons from direct sense observation, the inference of causes can only go so far--while one may be sure that someone acted as the agent cause, one cannot be sure of his motive, even if he reports those motives directly to him. One can have some measure of probability, if the agent is trustworthy, but since one cannot "read his soul" by his natural powers, one cannot be certain of the truth.)
The desire to write a perfect or complete history easily lends itself to reductionism, the attempt to answer the whys? of history with one form of determinism or another. If men are nothing more than animals, acting from self-interest or a set of "basic instincts," it is much easier to explain human action than when one recognizes that man has free choice. Of course, such a truncated history cannot but be unsatisfactory since it excludes so much from its analysis and the causes it gives are insufficient to explain what has happened.
(What is the attraction of biographies, besides the admiration or fascination we may have with some hero or villain? Those who have political power or influence in a society?)
Sima Qian
Sima Guang
Confucians and the Chinese literati held that history's purpose was didactic. Using history as an instrument of teaching morality is made easier if it is coupled to a view that history proceeds in cycles that repeat themselves. Even without this cyclic view, though, one could look for signs of decay that marked the decline of a dynasty and led ultimately to its fall. By knowing these signs, one could work against them in order to prop up the dynasty and preserve the empire. What do the exemplars of good rulers, beginning with the first sage-kings, teach us? And what of the tyrants and weak emperors? For the Confucians, history is an instrument of teaching morality, useful for illustrate general principles. (Assuming that one understands the historical data properly, which in itself can be difficult.)
Should we judge only by the agents' own criterion for success and failure? Qin Shi Huang Di, in his own mind, was a success, unifying the states to create Imperial China. I think the human heart yearns for more, some sort of moral direction--something that tells them what the meaning of life is, and what examples they should follow.
It is easy for one fall into a consequentialist mindset, and be so concerned only with writing about the consequences about people's actions--any sort of moral judgment must be left behind and the historian must be neutral. Perhaps the neutral historian would at least concede that it is not his role to make moral judgments, but for the teachers who are employing his texts to do so for the students.
One the other hand, if one writes history in this way, is it not potentially misleading? That actions should be judged good and bad solely by their consequences, and make our own choices accordingly? But if one applies traditional standards of morality when writing history, is one in danger of making judgments about people? It is clear that one be careful and not destroy the reputation of even the dead--and that a tenative judgment requires the exercise of caution as one sifts through the evidence. But if the evidence is plenty, as it is with say, Hitler, should the historian be prevented from describing his character as unjust? I've never seen that characterization be made--it is left to the reader to infer.
Those who would employ history to teach morality are not in the danger of falling into another version of the naturalistic fallacy, of blurring the so-called "is/ought" distinction. Otherwise anyone who looks to exemplars for behavior would be commiting this fallacy. But they are not, because they already have some understanding of what good behavior is, as God has planted the seeds of the Natural Law in all.
It is one thing to lay out the facts, another to evaluate and judge, which necessarily brings in the normative--the natural law and the moral sciences. But in looking for causes, must not one understand the effects first? For example, in addressing the question of how a society loses one politeia/constitution and acquires another, or what leads to regime change--one may not be able to assess the character and motivation of those involved, but one can at least record their actions. Maybe only those who have been given prophetic insight and knowledge from above can judge the characters of others--the rest of us must be content with speculation and choose our words accordingly.
When we look at the Roman Empire, or at China or any other great civilization, seeking to understand their decline and end, are we not looking for the causes so as to prevent our own communities from being destroyed from within?
Perhaps history is not as important to the statesman as virtue, moral science, and knowledge of the present and of the people and their traditions. Nonetheless, doesn't history help to illuminate those traditions and help us better understand them? (Even so, it is still necessary to show how those traditions embody the Natural Law.) Here one should make a distinction between the "formal" study of history as an academic discipline and the hearing of stories about one's forefathers, their achievements, and what they have handed down to us. The latter seem necessary in order to maintain a political identity, to sustain a polity and way of life.
How much of the formal intellectual preparation is necessary for individual Christians? As is the case with philosophers, perhaps not so much. When we talk of encounter and dialogue within a Christian context, we are speaking of a genuine desire to know about the other, so as to cultivate friendship, not to exploit or manipulate. It seems that Christian missionaries who were "successful" integrated themselves into the native culture as much as possible, avoiding only those things that were deemed contrary to the commandments. (Is that not what St. Paul himself teaches in 1 Corinthians 9:19-23?) Those who are engaged in apologetics may need to know other belief systems and religions in greater detail, but all Christians must exercise charity and understanding when dealing with others, praying for wisdom as they learn about the culture of others. This is part of the vocation of every Christian, not just of those who happened to be part of a certain lay group or movement.
As my mother says, showing by example can accomplish much in bringing others to God.
Cardinal Ratzinger on relativism (pdf)
Homily from the Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice
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