John Dickinson on Civil Society

The Spirit of American Constitutionalism: John Dickinson's Fabius Letters by Gregory S. Ahern

It is, therefore, the wisdom and virtue of the people rather than mere self-interest that is to be the ultimate check upon the government. Yet, Fabius also recognizes the fallibility of human nature. For, history shows that "the liberty of single republics has generally been destroyed by some of the citizens, and of confederated republics, by some of the associated states." The solution is to be found in ensuring that the government is sufficiently strong to protect "the worthy against the licentious."¹⁶ This leads to a discussion of the nature and purpose of political society as well as that of confederations of states:
As in forming a political society, each individual contributes some of his rights, in order that he may, from a common stock of rights, derive greater benefits, than he could from merely his own; so, in forming a confederation, each political society should contribute some share of their rights, as will, from a common stock, of these rights, produce the largest quantity of benefits for them.¹⁷The influence of Locke’s social compact theory of the foundations of society is evident here. Yet, Dickinson appeals beyond Locke to an idea of community far richer than Locke’s mere aggregate of atomized individuals. His thought, in fact, reflects both Aristotle’s idea of political society as based on friendship and the Christian doctrine of charity (love of neighbor). He writes:Humility and benevolence must take place of pride and overweening selfishness. Reason, rising above these mists, will then discover to us, that we cannot be true to ourselves, without being true to others—that to love our neighbors as ourselves, is to love ourselves in the best manner—that to give, is to gain—and, that we never consult our own happiness more effectually, than when we most endeavour to correspond with the divine designs, by communicating happiness, as much as we can, to our fellow-creatures.¹⁸

Did he overestimate the cultural unity of the original 13 states? Or, was he too optimistic that this cultural unity could be maintained?

He makes it clear that this confederation is not to be merely an aggregate of self-interested individuals, each contending for their own ends. For the people, he says, are "drawn together by religion, blood, language, manners and customs," and he likens the proposed confederation to a family, in which each son rules his own household, and in other matters the whole family is directed by the common ancestor. Fabius describes the nation that will result from such a confederation as a model of moderation, justice, and happiness. He writes:Delightful are the prospects that will open to the view of United America—her sons well prepared to defend their own happiness, and ready to relieve the misery of others—her fleets formidable, but only to the unjust—her revenue sufficient, yet unoppressive—her commerce affluent, but not debasing—peace and plenty within her borders—and the glory that arises from a proper use of power, encircling them.²²Dickinson’s view of society is thus closer to that of Vattel and Blackstone than to that of Locke. Vattel declared that rights were "nothing more than the power of doing what is morally possible, that is to say, what is proper and consistent with duty."²³ Russell Kirk has stated of Blackstone that,The natural law described by Blackstone was rooted in Christian ethics; and it declared "the absolute rights of man"—the natural liberty of mankind, consisting of three articles, "the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property." Yet, these rights were not absolute in the sense of having no limits: as Blackstone put it, "but every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to these laws which the community has thought proper to establish." There, more clearly expressed than by Locke, is a fundamental doctrine of American politics.²⁴Perhaps closest of all to Dickinson’s view of man and society, however, is that of Edmund Burke. For, both viewed civil society as a partnership which includes man’s relationship to God and which is directed toward the development of man’s higher nature. As Burke would write in his Reflections on the Revolution in France,[T]he state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, callico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. . . . [Without] civil society man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it. . . . He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also the necessary means of its perfection—He willed therefore the state—He willed its connexion with the source and original archetype of all perfection. . . . [For] His will . . . is the law of laws and the sovereign of sovereigns.²⁵For Dickinson, as for Burke, civil society is the necessary means by which human beings are connected with the divine, by which human nature is held in its appointed place in conformity to the higher moral law.²⁶