While there are Utilitarians who also are Libertarians, Utilitarianism cannot be reduced to one variant of Libertarianism, as there are many Utilitarians who believe that their principles can best be realized by e.g. some form of enlightened despotism (currently in the form of a ruling managerial/technocratic class);
Your entire discourse about “definitions” vs. “blanket terms” ends up in effect restating my own position in different words – especially when you come around to effectively equating the two. Of course definitions are blanket terms and are difficult. My point was a very straightforward epistemological one – if a person claims to know what he is talking about in speaking of X, then he must be able to offer *some* definition of X. I don’t know how you misunderstood that as being a claim that libertarianism itself is incoherent. I neither said nor implied any such thing.
The definition I offered for libertarianism – a political philosophy that advocates the minimal degree of government, in order to maximize individual freedom – is one with which you essentially agreed, and covers all of the variants of libertarianism you mention. (You omit the second half of my definition from you own statements, but it is the inherent purpose of the first half, of course. I think the omission is important because, as I have said before and will say again later, libertarianism has as its fundamental premise maximalization of self-determination rather than submission to God.)Of course libertarianism is wrought with factionalism. The difference between us is that I look past the anathemas that libertarians of different stripes hurl at one another to see that these are really based on disagreement over certain issues – e.g. whether in a libertarian society one person can sell himself into slavery to another person – rather than over the general definition. The accusations are rather like the polemics of 16th c. Protestant and Catholic apologists accusing each other of not even being Christians. (The objective distance provided by *not* being a libertarian has its advantage here!)
To deal at greater length with a more substantive point, I think the main problem with your argument lies in your reliance on the following:
“However I still think you have something when you say that in Romans 13 we can elucidate God 's demands for governance. I think we can understand Paul to be speaking of rulers in a very specific sense much like Thrasymachus and Socrates do in Book I of the Republic. That is to say, a ruler is only a ruler insofar as his behavior is in conformity with the nature of being a ruler. In this case Thrasymachus is positing that a ruler always acts in his own interest. Socrates points out that a ruler does not always know what is in his best interest, to which Thrasymachus responds that he is using the term ruler in a very specific sense. Insofar as the ruler acts in his best interest, he is a ruler. Insofar as he does not, he is not a ruler. Of course Socrates points out a flaw in Thrasymachus' definition, but accepts his use of this special sense. I think if we could use this specialized sense to define – though not exhaustively – a ruler as someone from whom the good have nothing to fear, but who punish the wicked. In this way, a ruler is not a ruler insofar as he injures the innocent.”
You appeal to this elsewhere in your arguments; e.g., in your post of 2/22/07 8”54:18 pm you argue that while the State may function as a “civil authority,” is not a “legitimate authority” or “true authority” if it appropriates property by force and theft (e.g. taxation without consent). You therefore argue that St. Paul distinguishes a “true government” from a “bad government” and does not recognize the latter as a “true authority.”
The problem in your argument is that you equivocate repeatedly on the connotations of “true,” “legitimate,” “bad,” etc. On the basis of the passage from Plato you quote, and your construal of it, “bad” means not a government at all in any sense. But in your later appeal to it just cited, you distinguish between “civil” and “legitimate” authority, which thus implicitly recognizes that even a “bad” government is still in some sense a real government, one with institutional existence but not moral authority. Similarly, you also equivocate between “true” and “legitimate” as denoting actually existent on the one hand and morally grounded on the other, and end up implicitly conflating the two senses repeatedly.
I’ll being by addressing the passage from the Republic –
First, Plato/Socrates refutes Thrasymachus’ claim that a ruler always acts in his own interests. (I assume this is the “flaw” to which you refer.) Thus: “Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.” Also: “I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.”
Second, Plato/Socrates does not assert the claim you attribute to him – that a ruler is a ruler only when and insofar he acts as a ruler. That is Thrasymachus’ claim. Plato/Socrates responds by agreeing or disagreeing, but with a distinguo between the essential identity and deficient realization of that identity for a given art (medicine, navigation, ruling), and then considers the proper interest of an art qua essential identity. The question of whether X ceases to be X essentially if and when it fails to acts as X rightly ought to is not specifically answered (though Plato’s response implies rejection, not acceptance, of Thrasymachus’ claim here). But even if one grants that Plato accepts the claim, it only sets forth a fallacious notion that were soundly refuted and laid to rest by Aristotle.
In order to say that “a ruler is only a ruler insofar as his behavior is in conformity with the nature of being a ruler,” one must therefore first define what a ruler is per se (“in so far as he is a ruler,” “considered as ruler”), and then what I will for brevity call the “conformity criterion.” We must therefore disentangle different senses in which we speak of someone being a “ruler.”
To say that someone is a ruler per se is to define what he is with reference to essential being rather than accidental quality. (I.e., To say “John is a man” is to define him essentially; to say that “John is wavy-haired” is to speak of him accidentally, since he may become bald without ceasing to be John.) Substantially, in the sense of per se or essential being, X is a ruler as being a person who holds a specified position of authority over others with corresponding power to act. With reference to his essential being, then, X acts as a ruler when his actions are ones defined by the authority and power of his office and intentionally performed to realization of that end. Note that this is a distinct question from whether those actions are wise or just.
But you assert instead that a ruler *is* a ruler in essential being only if and when he acts as a ruler *ought* to act, rather than merely acting within the definitions of his authority and power. I.e., you claim that an unjust or unwise action is by definition outside the authority and power of the “true” or “legitimate” ruler’s office. As previously noted, you thus make a fallacious and unworkable conflation of the is/ought distinction, of substantial essence with moral imperative. But a ruler who issues an unwise or unjust law does not cease to be a ruler any more than (to use Plato's examples) a physician who prescribes the wrong treatment for a patient ceases to be a physician, or the eye with defective sight ceases to be an eye.
The following example illustrates the problem with your argument. Suppose that at 5:00 p.m. on January 10, 2001, President Clinton had a stack of 10 bills of pardon on his desk to sign; that 5 were just for him to sign and 5 were unjust for him to sign; the bills were before him in alternate sequence; and each took one minute to sign. According to your argument, Clinton was a ruler at 5:00, ceased to be a ruler at 5:01, became a ruler again at 5:02, ceased again to be a ruler at 5:03, etc.
It was in large part to deal with the absurdity of entities being and ceasing to be themselves from moment to moment according to such a criterion that led Aristotle to make his essence/nature distinction and corresponding distinction between substantial and accidental types of change. The argument that Aristotle refutes here actually goes back to the Pre-Socratic deadlock between Parmenides and Heraclitus over identity and change (or change and continuity) and the relation of identity to activity. (Thrasymachus is a latter-day representative of this deadlock.) What Aristotle did to get beyond that deadlock was to show that:
a) certain activities properly express the essential being or identity (ousia) of an entity, whereas others are only accidental to that being;
b) continuity of specific capacities (dynamis) and activities (energeia) identify an entity as a continuously existing substantial unity through time;
c) entities can suffer accidental changes to their properties, accidents, and activities without thereby ceasing to be what they are and losing their substantial identities, so long as their underlying essential capacities for these are not lost; and
d) substantial change occurs when an entity loses its unitary essence and with it the essential capacities for corresponding action.
To use an Aristotelian illustration: It is the nature of a fish according to its essence to swim in water. If an eagle seizes the fish and carries it away, the fish acts contrary to its nature in that it moves in an unnatural fashion [the fact that it does only by external constraint rather than internal volition does not affect the analysis here], but it does not thereby cease to be a fish in essence and substance. The fallacy of the argument you support lies in its failure to distinguish essence (to ti en einai) and substance (ousia) on the one hand, from nature (physis) and activity (energeia) that occurs according to or contrary to nature (kata/para physin) on the other, and thus properly to distinguish substantial from non-substantial change.In short, the “conformity criterion” as offered by Plato and Aristotle, in contrast to your idea of it, does not mean that a law or ruler that is faulty or defective is not, or ceases to be, a law or a ruler per se, any more than the “bad” eye with blurred vision cease to be a “true” or “legitimate” eye. (Note that Plato’s argument, on which you rely, about “faulty” or “defective” – what you call “bad” – does not distinguish between physical and moral defect, but equates the two.) And your argument (and Plato’s as well) also does not distinguish between the unjust and the unwise, but considers both to be illegitimate.
Consider further the following examples:
a) President Clinton signs a bill passed by Congress to fund the Armed Forces.
b) President Clinton signs a bill passed by Congress to reinstate the military draft for all able-bodied men age 17 to 26.
c) President Clinton issues an executive order requiring all male Secret Service personnel while on duty to wear, as an official uniform, lime green blazers with neon purple stripes and bright yellow polka-dots, along with pink Lederhosen decorated with red diamonds, supplemented with ruffled clown collars, bandolieros, and floppy open-toed sandals.
d) President Clinton watches a movie for relaxation with Hillary and Chelsea.
e) President Clinton has Monica Lewinsky perform oral sex on him while he is negotiating a treaty with the leader of another nation by phone.
f) President Clinton has sex with a female cabinet member of another nation’s government in order to gain from her by his seduction information vital to the national security of the USA (e.g. to pre-empt an imminent nuclear attack by terrorists).[Purely for the sake of argument here, I will take the liberty of assuming that, like many other Libertarians, you consider it a legitimate of government to maintain Armed Forces but consider it an illegitimate exercise of force for it to have a military draft.]
Now, in which of these six examples is Clinton acting as a ruler, and in which is he not so acting? According to your criterion, only in a) is Clinton acting as a ruler. Along with Aristotle and philosophers since him, I hold that this criterion is clearly wrong. However unwise or unjust the action in b) and c), Clinton clearly acts as a ruler in those as well. His actions are ones defined by the authority and power of his office and intentionally performed to realization of that end (more on this shortly). He clearly is not acting as a ruler in d), but as a private citizen apart from his office.
Situations e) and f) are more ambiguous. In e), we have concurrent but formally (in the causal sense) unrelated actions. Clinton simultaneously acts both as a private citizen (with respect to Monica) and as a ruler (with respect to the foreign leader); but on your criterion, I think one would have to deny that Clinton is a ruler at all in both respects, in that his reckless action with Monica is surely having a deleterious effect by extreme distraction on his actions as a negotiator. In f), we have a division and distinction of means and ends. Clinton's action in having sex is not defined by the power and authority of his office, and in that sense he does not act as a ruler; however, insofar as he acts to seek the welfare of the nation as a just ruler should, he does act as a ruler. Unlike is e), however, the unjust action (fornication) is causally related (at least in the efficient and final senses) to the just action (protection of the nation from attack). But your position would hold either that (again) Clinton is not a ruler at all in such a scenario, or else would have to argue that Clinton would only not be a ruler if his unjust action was unjust with respect to being defined by the authority and power of his office and performed to realization of that end rather than unjust in all moral senses -- but in that case you are switching definitional streams in mid-course and discarding your criterion for the one I have drawn from Aristotle.
The sticking point here concerns “intentionally performed to realization of that end.” “Realization of that end” is defined objectively with respect to the intrinsic nature of the entity involved. However, as the distinction between being X defectively vs. not being X at all indicates, defective intentionality does not necessarily completely negate such realization. This if one agrees with Plato that the end of rule is justice, does example c) negate that or not? Most of us would regard Clinton order regarding Secret Service agent garb unwise and detracting from the dignity of the authority of legitimate government. But it is difficult to see an argument for it being unjust per se as an act of government. For if Clinton, through some absurd delusion, truly thinks that such uniforms enhance the dignity and functionality of the agents, then he acts with the requisite intent, however flawed his judgment. (One might argue that it is unjust to the agents personally, but that is a different issue, especially since such agents serve voluntarily at the pleasure of the rule and in so doing submit themselves in advance to his authority.)
Note that if one in good conscience cannot obey a law (i.e., it is unjust), then one can engage in civil disobedience. But your position by definition also paradoxically eradicates the very existence of "civil disobedience," for civil disobedience can only be exercised against an unjust ruler and law, and your position holds that in such a situation there is no ruler or law, therefore one cannot be disobeying either one. [It also appears from your argument that you misapprehend Aquinas to be saying that an invalid law is not a law at all, which is not the case.]
To recast these examples, in a) we agree that Clinton acts as a ruler in both a “civil” and a “true” sense. In b) and c) we agree that he acts in a civil sense, but disagree about the “true” sense. In d) we agree that he does not act as a ruler in any sense. In e) and f) the situation is more ambiguous. In e) and f) Clinton does not act as a ruler in a moral sense, or formally in the “civil” sense, but his non-ruler actions arguably have an impact on his ability to function in both senses. [I suspect that, not sharing Christian sexual morals, Plato might well argue that in f) Clinton does act as a ruler in both an essential and moral sense, even if his particular action is not formally defined or specified under the civil aspect of his office.] The problem is that, in conflating the essential and moral senses of “true” and “legitimate,” you wish to use the lack of correct moral or prudential justification for certain actions by a ruler to deny that they are a ruler’s actions at all, instead of merely classifying them as defective or wrong actions.
This brings us to another major problem in your argument --
Your position also begs a central question (or else avoids it altogether): who gets to define what is an unwise or unjust law, or unwise or unjust conduct by a ruler? Under libertarian principles, the individual necessarily would do so. But if each individual libertarian can willy-nilly decide for himself a ruler whether a law or a ruler’s actions are just or unjust, wise or unwise, then what we have is anarchism, pure and simple. There can be no civil disobedience because there is no society, which becomes a complete fiction – there are only completely self-determining individuals. But if the libertarian surrenders this to society, then he has not way to limit the encroachments of government on his individual freedoms and effectively betrays his own fundamental principle. (This difficulty does not arise for e.g. a natural law conservative, since his determination of justice is not tied a priori to an absolute assertion of minimal government and maximal individual liberty, but can be determined more pragmatically.)
Similarly, you repeatedly refer to an exercise of “force” by the State with regard to the extent of its rule, taxation, etc. But again, who gets to define “force” here? E.g. with regards to taxation, you charge your opponents with giving the State a pass to what you refer to as the “universal moral law.” (The phrase itself is ambiguous – it tends toward equivocation between a reference to a particular moral law that is universal, and an assertion that all morals laws are universals. It appears that you generally mean the latter – in which case “universal” is simply redundant verbiage – though your appeal to the idea that no-one has the right to initiate force tends towards the former instead.) But in so doing to resort to a lubricious and illegitimate logical slide. You move from disagreeing with your opponents about whether particular action X (e.g. some form of taxation) constitutes a violation of the moral law, to asserting that they agree with you that X constitutes such a violation but make an exception to that law for the State. But there is no such agreement in place. As a philosophy professor rightly chided me on a class paper almost 30 years ago, “You can’t just *define* your opponent into being wrong.” You complain of strawmen being erected, and yet that is exactly to what you resort in pretending that your opponents give the State a pass to violate a moral law.
And so, again, who gets to define “force”? Some folks on one side believe that taxation by the government for some specific function (e.g. the military in general and Iraqi War in particular) is justified; others do not and decry it as “expropriation” and “force.” But the latter cannot simply turn around and, on the basis of their own conviction, accuse the former of exempting the government from the moral law against theft, for the former clearly do not believe that any theft is occurring. But if it is left to each individual to determine which taxes he wishes to pay or not pay, according as he deems the putative purpose just or unjust, then the result is simply anarchism. (This of course shows up the flaw in taxation as “fee for service” analogy you use – under a fee for service plan, the consumer chooses the particular services for which he pays a fee, and has the right to cancel his contract, neither of which exists under government.)
This brings us back to a discussion of Romans 13. I have taken the time to consult a number of commentaries on this passage. First, there is universal agreement that the “higher powers” to which St. Paul refers are government officials. While exegesis may extend that to other figures (e.g. slave owners), your claim that St. Paul dos not mean (or mean only) government officials here is simply wrong. (Also, important non-governmental persons of influence in society are referred to as “civic leaders,” not “civil authorities”, a term that properly applies only to government officials. Your conflation of both under the latter term is out of order.)
Second, as I previously said, the passage is a general description, not a universal one. To refine this a bit further, it is a general description of the *purpose* for which God ordained government, not a universal description of how every actual government in fact behaves.
Third, your argument for an alleged absurdity of the “plain meaning” of the text follows from a faulty exegesis that restricts the application of “good” and “evil” to purely temporal fortunes. However, the general exegesis commonly put forward by several of he patristic fathers takes care of that by adding the proper spiritual dimension as follows.
The divinely appointed purpose of temporal rulers is to reward virtue and punish vice. To the extent that a ruler does so, he acts justly. Thus, to the extent that a Christian behaves virtuously and eschews vice, he will have praise and reward from rulers, and to the extent he does not he will justly suffer condemnation and punishment from them. However, even if a ruler acts unjustly, he still acts as the servant of God to these ends for the Christian, albeit unwittingly. For, as Ethan has already pointed out (per Matt.10:28 and I Peter 3:8-22), while the Christian is not obligated to obey laws of men contrary to the laws of God, he is generally obligated (insofar as it concerns himself) to suffer patiently the temporal consequences of punishment from the state for such disobedience to earthly laws. Here, if e.g. the pagan Roman emperor arrests a Christian for refusing to sacrifice to the genius of the emperor and sends the latter to death in the arena, the Christian still has praise and reward for acting virtuously – but now that praise and reward is spiritual and eternal, and the emperor has been a witting rather than unwitting instrument in its bestowal. And likewise the Christian to succumbs here and obeys the world rather than God will reap spiritual condemnation and punishment, and again the emperor is the unwitting instrument for the same. In the end, disobedience to God still ends up serving the sovereignty and glory of God.
Thus, Rom. 13 is not about civil disobedience, any more than it is about libertarianism. It is rather about godly submission in all things. (That is one reason why Rom.13 follows immediately upon the discussion of submission in Rom. 12.) This exegesis also allows for a distinction between the institution of government in general as divinely ordained, vs. a claim that every ruler rules as the servant of God according to God’s perfect will rather than His permissive will. No-one here has suggested that “God ordains each and every [particular] government” by His perfect will – that is yet another straw man of yours, Thomas. E.g., God did not appoint Hitler as chancellor of Germany – but He did suffer Hitler to rule Germany, and bring it to utter ruin, that the folly of utter human evil might be made absolutely clear. Thus, Hitler and all who followed him unwittingly served the greater purposes of God; and likewise those who resisted Hitler also served God’s purposes, some wittingly and some unwittingly. Ditto for Stalin – he too was God’s servant, albeit unknowingly and unwittingly. By contrast, we do not have to say that the Christians who disobeyed Nero will incur God’s punishment – indeed, just the opposite. They incurred temporal punishment from Nero, but eternal reward from God.
An excellent and convenient summary discussion of the preceding that tackles many of the questions raised by you, Ethan, myself, and others here, with citations to various Church Fathers, may be found on pp. 1074-75 of "A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture" (London/New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1953). (It remains by far the best one-volume commentary on Scripture ever compiled; copies are usually readily available on the used-book market.) To offer two examples (quotations taken from the "Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture" -- New Testament, Vol. VI: Romans, pp. 323-329), here first is St. Chrysostom from his "Homilies on Romans":
"Paul has a good deal to say on this matter in his other epistles also, placing subjects under their rulers in the same way that household servants are under their masters. He does this to show that Christ did not introduce his laws for the purpose of undermining the state, but rather so that it should be better governed. He does not speak about individual rulers but about the principle of authority itself. . . .What is the meaning of 'not only to avoid God's wrath'? It means not only because you resist God by not being subject, nor only because you are bringing great evils on yourself both from God and from the ruler, but also because the ruler is a benefactor to you in things of the utmost importance, because he brings you peace and the blessings of civil institutions. States receive countless blessings through these authorities, and if they were taken away, everything would go to pieces."
Second, St. Augustine, from his commentary on Romans:
"Most rightly, Paul warns against anyone who is puffed up with pride by the fact that he has been called by his Lord into freedom and become a Christian, and therefore thinks that he does not have to keep the status given to him in the course of this life or submit to the higher powers to whom the government of temporal things has been confided for a time. . . .But as far as the spiritual side is concerned, in which we believe in God and are called into his kingdom, it is not right for us to be subject to any man who seeks to overturn in us the very thing which God has been pleased to grant us so that we might obtain eternal life. So if anyone thinks that because he is a Christian he does not have to pay taxes or tribute nor show the proper respect to the authorities who take care of these things, he is in very great error." [Note two points: a) St. Augustine does not make any exception for taxes procured by "force" or lack of consent; b) the dividing line here between obedience and civil disobedience, between recognition and denial of a ruler's authority, is between temporal and spiritual matters, not over whether he rules justly or unjustly in temporal matters. JAA] "Likewise, if anyoen thinks that he ought to submit to the point where he accepts that someone who is his superior in temporal affairrs should have authority even over his faith, he falls into an even greater error. But the balance which the Lord himself prescribed is to be maintained: 'Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's but unto God the things which are God's.' . . .This can upset some people, when they think that Christians have often suffered persecution by these authorities. They say: 'Were these Christians not doing good, since not only did the authorities not praise them, they punished and killed them!' The apostle's words must be carefully considered. He does not say: 'Do what is good and the authorities will praise you,' but: 'Do what is good and you will have praise from him.' Whether someone in authority approves what you do or persecutes you, 'you will have praise from him,' either when you win it by your obedience to God or when you earn your crown by persecution. . . .This is helpful for understanding that, because of this life, we must be subject and not offer resistance if anyone wants to take something from us, if it is within his power to do so, because authority has been given to him over temporal things, which will pass away. We are not to be subject in those good things which remain forever but only in the needs of this age. But when he says 'one must be subject,' lest anyone submit to the authorities halfheartedly and not from pure love, Paul adds: 'not only to avoid . . . wrath but also for the sake of conscience.' That is to say, you should not submit simply to avoid the authorities' anger, which can be done by pretense, but so that you might be assured in your conscience that you are doing this out of love for him. For you submit at your Lord's command."
The lack of the Christian element of *submission* to earthly authority in the sense just discussed is a key part of what demarcates libertarianism from Christianity and makes the two ultimately incompatible. For the libertarian, rather than suffering due submission according to Christina principles, arrogates to himself the right to determines what is just and unjust, what is or is not force, and asserts a fundamental right to worldly rebellion rather than sufferance of worldly injustice. Once again, it is in the end self-centered rather than God-centered.
This also becomes apparent in several moral issues arising in relation to libertarianism in contrast to natural law theory, e.g.:
A)Suicide and Drug Use – The libertarian may present an argument that suicide and drug use contravene libertarian principles in that they destroy the ability of the self-destroying agent henceforth to act rationally to maximize his individual liberties. But what he cannot do is present any argument from libertarianism per se as to why a legitimate government can have a vested interest in laws against suicide or drug use, since the life and health of the individual is treated as his absolute private property, to dispose of as he will.
B)Fornication and Prostitution – Again, on an individualistic view of one’s body as one’s private property, the libertarian can present no argument as to why a legitimate government can have vested laws against extra-marital sexual conduct. You cite a general absence of laws against prostitution in the Middle Ages, and St. Augustine as saying that “while prostitution is a sin, it is not to be prohibited for the sake of the public peace.” What this statement glosses over is that St. Augustine’s rationale is fundamentally different than that of the libertarian. The libertarian argument presents the claim that prostitution may not be prohibited if it entails “violation of property without the consent of the owner.” But St. Augustine would never, ever, recognize any such “right” of a property owner against the authority of government – let alone God – to use his property for the commission of sin. Such a notion of “private property” inherent in libertarianism is absolutely contrary to Scripture. His concession is rather strictly prudential – that the cost of the effort is greater than the expected benefit. If circumstances were to change (e.g. the overall population became much more Christian), then that prudential judgment could quite easily be reversed and such legal suppression of prostitution approved.
C)Legal requirement of the wealthy to aid the poor. You object that it is not “morally defensible to use force to extricate resources from the rich, except where life itself is in danger of extinction.” First, the Pentateuch and Prophets have numerous laws that disagree with you – so apparently you deem Scripture not “morally defensible.” Second, the individualistic principles of libertarianism can provide *no* reason as to why the rich should be required to provide aid to the poor even when the lives of the latter are in danger. You may assert that on the basis of your Christian convictions, but you can’t get it out of libertarianism per se, except on an ad hoc and artificially forced basis.
None of this is a license for a government to do as it pleases. But it is to point out that Scripture does not countenance the libertarian principle that the individual may do primarily as he pleases.
You have mentioned that your theory of libertarianism is heavily indebted to a particular concept of private property. That is no surprise, though it is for you to articulate that more specifically. But, in general anticipation of it, I would respond in advance as follows. Contrary to the fond delusion of many people, Scripture does *not* endorse the concept of private property as something absolutely alienated to the individual possessor against all other claims by other persons or government. On the contrary, the Pentateuch and the Prophets are filled with laws and commands to the contrary (universal remission of debt and manumission of servants in the 7th and jubilee years, for starters).
What Scripture does do is support the idea that property is held in stewardship on behalf of God – the sole owner of all property – as a personal possession for use in trust and accountability. That prevents claims of absolutely alienation out of greed by the possessing steward, other persons, and government alike. Rather, the relative claims to the property are determined according to divine principles of needful and discretionary use. But, as the example of prostitution shows, libertarianism claims that a theory of absolute possession of private property trumps the Scriptural principle of all property as subject to retention or forfeiture according to godly or ungodly, profitable or unprofitable, use. It is, ultimately, a form of idolatry – worship of private property as a god. Theft is indeed a violation of God’s law – the problem is that, from the standpoint of God, the assertion of individual absolute right to some piece of property can constitute “theft” just as much as forceful expropriation by another person or the state.
Particularly remarkable here is the invocation of a “universal moral law” against “initiation of force” such as theft – and yet no recognition whatsoever of an equally God-given universal moral law against e.g. sexual immorality. On what Scriptural basis, Thomas, do you claim that one exists, and not the other, or that the first outranks the second, or that only the first but not the second is subject to enforcement or restriction by earthy law? All of this comes out of libertarianism instead, and is contrary to Scripture.
Finally, you say to me I resort to “sheer assertion” and that “Unless you demonstrate that I do not have scriptural warrant, your argument is no argument at all.” On the contrary, by elementary laws of logic, *you* are the one who bears the burden of proof here. I have put forward a full-scale argument, not just assertion, as to why libertarian and Christian principles are ultimately incompatible. It is up to you to demonstrate otherwise, and to prove that you are not simply making a "sheer assertion.". The parts of your philosophy do not “all cohere, and originate from [my] Christianity.” They are rather an inconsistent admixture of your Christianity and your libertarianism, and there are unfortunately points where thee latter rules the former instead of vice-versa.
A brief postscript –
Douglas keeps trying to pigeon-hole me falsely as a statist liberal on the basis of a black-white fallacy that supposes the only alternatives are no government intervention or unlimited government intervention. There is something in between – the classical conservative model of limited but strong government that is duly authorized to act in certain ways in certain restricted and well-defined spheres. (Also contrary to Douglas, the "state" is not merely an abstraction; "nation-state", "affairs of state" and "reasons" of state" are spoken of with good reason. Rather, the "state" is a somewhat indeterminate but not infinitely open-ended entity, like e.g. my "life". My life is not a definitely circumscribed and self-contained material entity, but neither is it an abstraction. It is dynamic rather than static; so too in its own way is the state.) The principles for determining that, and preventing government from exceeding its warrant, can be drawn from Scripture, classical orthodox Christian theology, natural law theory, and similar sources. The reason that libertarianism, like syndicalism and anarchism on the one hand, and Marxism and Fascism on the other, is (properly) viewed as being on the political extreme, rather than at the political center, is precisely because it sets up a particular view of the relation of government, persons, and property as an absolute, rather than beginning with divine and natural law as absolutes and then from that pragmatically determining the relation of government, persons, and property.
Aside from the useful suggestions of my good friend GL, if one wants a biblical basis for actions by rulers that (so far as I can tell) from a libertarian perspective absolutely infringe on individual rights to private property, and positively require (rather than just commend) individuals to render charity to the poor – give various chapters of Exodus - Deuteronomy a thorough reading on topics such as remission of debt every seven years, freeing of bonded servants in the year of Jubilee, requirements to give the poor raiment, food, shelter, interest-free loans without guarantee, forbidding to hold pledges overnight, etc., etc. How those provisions should be translated from a theocratic society to a secular one is a very complex question. The fact that the provisions are there is indisputable, and as OT types to NT antitypes they retain binding authority upon Christians as moral patterns. And, obviously, the principle of stewardship requires that one gives wisely, not indiscriminately, to persons or organizations under consideration.
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More generally to all:
To reiterate and amplify – the problem with a supposed complete compatibility (as opposed to partial congruence) between libertarianism and Christianity is that the Christian draws his fundamental principles from the Scriptures (and their exegesis by the fathers), and then uses them to endeavor to formulate a coherent political philosophy. The libertarian, by contrast, puts the cart before the horse. He starts with his political philosophy based on certain non-Scriptural principles and then squares his interpretation of Scripture to conform to those.
The foundational principle of the Christian life is freedom from sin for service to God. The foundational principle of libertarianism is minimal government for maximal individual freedom. The two are obviously not the same. The second is defined primarily with reference to relations between self and the state, the former with reference to relations between the self and God. The second seeks to maximize freedom and rights for the self; the former seeks to relinquish all freedom and rights in complete self-surrender to God. A system whose foundational principle is to maximize claims for putative individual rights and freedom of self-determination in this world simply does not square with one whose foundational principle involves renunciation of *any* supposition that one is entitled to have one's own will, as opposed to God's will, for the self.
Now, the self-identified Christian libertarian may argue (as I take it that e.g. Eric is thoughtfully doing) that a proper application of the libertarian principle will be in conformity with the fundamental Christian principle. I.e., precisely by limiting the sphere and power of the state as much as possible, the believer will be given freedom without worldly interference to make his submission to God. In pragmatic terms, I personally would agree that there is a fair degree of congruence between the two (though far from 100%).
But that does not address the fundamental problem here. While libertarianism may give the individual the *option* of choosing use his freedom from state interference to pursue the Christian life, unlike the natural and divine law it has no *requirement* that he so use his freedom. Its foundational principle is maximization of self-determination apart from state interference, not self-surrender to God. It is, in short, inherently lacking a moral imperative beyond (to cite just one example – I realize that the libertarians here reject Ayn Rand) the Randian injunction "always to act is one's rational self-interest." (Which is tautological -- Rand of course never offered a definition or instance of irrational self-interest.) Under libertarianism, each individual necessarily determines what is in his self-interest, for if the state does it, then there can be no argument for minimal government.
That is not to say that the state *should* determine that instead. It is rather to point out yet again that:
a) self, not God, is the central acting and determining agent in libertarianism, and
b) unlike Christianity, libertarianism does not and cannot enjoin any positive moral injunction and obligation upon the self to take positive action to do good unto others beyond "do no overt harm." Not only can it not enjoin the Christian principle and obligation of self-sacrifice for others, it also has no basis for condemning the man who fails so to do; indeed, it must positively commend e.g. the secular libertarian for pursuing the *foundational principle* of maximization of individual freedom vis-a-vis the state, even if the Christian libertarian thinks how it is being done *in practice* by the secular libertarian is mistaken.Perhaps the libertarian will argue that libertarianism is a political philosophy, and not a moral one, and therefore it is unfair to expect it to generate the latter. The problem is that the libertarian claims that his principle of maximal human determination and minimal government interference is not just a pragmatic one, but an absolute one – which thus makes it a moral principle. And by being asserted as *the* foundational principle, it is set ahead of all Scriptural moral principles. Scripture is thus tailored to fit libertarianism, rather than the other way around.
Ultimately, Scripture does not endorse *any* type of human government, for, as C. S. Lewis noted, from the standpoint of Scripture, all human governments (including none at all) are makeshifts, poor substitutes that fall short of direct obedience to God. I originally posted the following quote from Lewis on 1/31/07 under the thread “Rebuilding Hadrian’s Wall.” It is from an essay titled "Willing Slaves of the Welfare State" [with an obvious sidelong glance at "That Hideous Strength"]:
"I do not like the pretensions of Government – the grounds on which it demands my obedience – to be pitched too high. I don't like the medicine man's magical pretensions nor the Bourbon's Divine Right. This is not solely because I disbelieve in magic and in Bossuet's 'Politique'. I believe in God, but I detest theocracy. For every Government consists of mere men and is, strictly viewed, a makeshift; if it adds to its commands 'thus saith the Lord', it lies, and lies dangerously.
"On just the same grounds I dread government in the name of science. That is how tyrannies come in. . . .
"Let us not be deceived by phrases about 'Man taking charge of his destiny'. All that can really happen is that some men will take charge of the destinies of the others. They will simply be men; none perfect; some greedy, cruel, and dishonest. The more completely we are planned the more powerful they will be. Have we discovered some new reasons why, this time, power should not corrupt as it has done before?"Lewis’ principle applies just as well to the claims of individualism, of absolute self-government apart from God’s moral law, as to statist claims over personal possessions.
Thus, I maintain my original position. While Christians and libertarians may agree on the solutions to a number of specific issues, they do so on the basis of fundamentally different and ultimately irreconcilable foundational principles.
I need to read the C.S. Lewis citation to know if C.S. Lewis is just talking about the imperfections of human government, or if he is saying something else in addition to this.
