Two Responses to William Cavanaugh on the Modern State

Thomas Storck, William Cavanaugh's "Killing For The Telephone Company," A Critique

A response to both Storck and Cavanaugh: Cavanaugh and the Question of the State by Joshua Bowman

The major problem with Storck's critique is that he ignores the problem of scale - perhaps an assumption about scale is implicit in Cavanaugh's critique of the modern state but he should have made it explicit. Aristotle, as I don't cease to point out, certainly had much to stay about scale and we are reminded of the fundamental importance of scale to the health of a community by 20th century thinkers like Leopold Kohr, E.F. Schumacher, and Kirkpatrick Scale.

The consolidation of power, political and economic - facilitated by improvement in communication and cheap energy. Earlier large political units (I would not call them polities) were forced by the limits of energy and communication to be somewhat decentralized, with some empires more decentralized than others (Roman and Chinese and Persian).

What of the managerial state, with the development of bureaucracy which seeks to legislate every tiny detail? What bigger violation of "subsidiarity" could there be at this point, as the bureaucracy serves those who hold power and implements their will?

Even if they claimed to be sovereign would their claim be just or right?

Schumacher on Land

Schumacher Center for a New Economics: THINK ABOUT LAND
By Dr. E. F. Schumacher
A talk originally published by The Catholic Housing Aid Society

An Argument for Monarchy

Exalted Hierarchy by John Maelstrom

The monarch would be elected and not inherit his office from his father; this would be more in accordance with distributive justice.

"Engagement" or "Withdrawal"?

Natural Law and Positive Law: A Response to Thomas Storck by Dylan Pahman (Mr. Storck's essay, "Natural Law, Politics, and the Transformation of America")

What has participation in "movement conservatism" yielded for traditional conservatives on the national level? How can one appeal to natural law, or "naturally known" moral truths on a wide scale (through the mass media, no less) to facilitate moral conversion? Has that ever happened in history? The freedom to participate in an extremely degraded version of democracy gives the illusion that Christians have the power to bring about positive change through the National Government; this is coupled with a misunderstanding of the obligations of citizenship, namely, that one has the "duty" to choose the "lesser of two evils" when voting for a candidate for office (which is a consequentialist understanding of voting and not one rooted in distributive justice) if no one meets the "ideal" based on his platform (as opposed to his character). When the national candidates are committed to perpetuating the status quo and not facilitating communal renewal by curbing the forces that threaten community (whether it be the oligarchs and their economic power or their servants in the National Government who seek greater power for themselves), then what exactly do Christians expect to accomplish? Imposing a moral agenda through the Federal Government not only violates the federal character of the U.S. Constitution but is impossible - the electoral power of Christians is too weak and diffuse.

Mr. Pahman writes:

While I am sensitive to Storck’s insistence that evangelism deserves renewed zeal for the sake of moral progress in society, I feel his opposition of evangelism rather than political action (or, more accurately, evangelism then political action) is ultimately harmful. In particular, there would seem to be no vocation for the Christian as citizen or civil servant today, no vital service that he/she has to offer to the kingdom of God now in his/her civic capacity before such a widespread evangelization has taken place. Whether or not one or the other is “a more hopeful project” is, furthermore, no reason to discourage the theological virtue of hope or the working of divine grace in either evangelization or political activism, especially in a country like the United States where the average citizen has a far greater civic role to play than citizens of an ancient or medieval monarchy. Both are possible duties and essential contributions to the kingdom of heaven and the common good.

And so we see that Mr. Pahman has been beguiled into thinking that the average American has a great "civic role" to play than his ancient or medieval counterparts. This may have been true after independence from Great Britain was obtained, but it has not been true for quite some time.

Civil servant or bureaucrat? If a bureaucrat is enforcing bad laws that destroy freedom (and subsidarity and community), can one continue in good conscience? The lay vocation of the Christian is to build community, starting with his family and church community, then expanding outwards to his non-Christian neighbors and those around him. This has been constant, but we have been blinded because we have been inculturated in radical atomization and an exaggerated notion of the nation-state (which has either knowingly or unknowingly done what it can to destroy any "intermediate" associations or communities) - hence we identify political participation solely with voting and holding political office. (Performing jury duty is an important component, but how many of us would prefer not to do it because it is deemed inconvenient?) Secondly, the theological virtue pertains to God and our salvation, not to the political community as such. The act of building community is a truly political act - it is not "withdrawal" (just as refraining from interventionism is not isolationism). Ruling may be a more noble political political act, but Christians do not exercise it at the national "level" and in many states they do not do so at the state level. If movement conservatism is to have an impact, it should direct its attention to those states which are still Christian in character and seek to educate their citizens about federalism, states' rights, communitarianism, and so on, rather than promoting "free-market capitalism" which hollows out communities. Do you think movement conservates is capable of turning away the money from donors in the oligarchy and putting themselves out of a job?

Mr. Storck has an excellent response to the article. I think he and Dr. Fleming would be in agreement on the proper strategy for American Catholics and other genuine Christians.

Cultural Marxism continues to hollow out the state

Is it a good thing that ideology trumps effectiveness (not to mention justice) when it destroys the means by which ideology can be spread? First they opened select combat roles to women, now they are considering allowing women to go to Ranger School.

Women being considered for elite Ranger school
LLAD: Ranger School welcomes women, drops standards


The non-ladies are out in force in this discussion of the proposal at FB.

Related:
VFR

Democracy (or a mixture of oligarchy and democracy as we have it) is a deviant regime. Is it therefore intrinsically not ordered to the common good? Certainly bad regimes violate distributive justice, and the problem is worsened when feminism is introduced to the mix, giving women a share in ruling simply on the belief that they are equal to men. (And they are not.) Are bad regimes therefore illegitimate? If so, and if the Church cannot say as much, would it not be better for the Church to keep silence rather than continue to admonish leaders to "do what is right" and thus give their regimes the semblance of validation and legitimacy? How can regime correction be promoted if the Church does not oppose the regime?

Am I a modern conservative?

The Pillars of Modern American Conservatism by Alfred S. Regnery

The first pillar of conservatism is liberty, or freedom. Conservatives believe that individuals possess the right to life, liberty, and property, and freedom from the restrictions of arbitrary force. They exercise these rights through the use of their natural free will. That means the ability to follow your own dreams, to do what you want to (so long as you don’t harm others) and reap the rewards (or face the penalties). Above all, it means freedom from oppression by government—and the protection of government against oppression. It means political liberty, the freedom to speak your mind on matters of public policy. It means religious liberty—to worship as you please, or not to worship at all. It also means economic liberty, the freedom to own property and to allocate your own resources in a free market.

Conservatism is based on the idea that the pursuit of virtue is the purpose of our existence and that liberty is an essential component of the pursuit of virtue. Adherence to virtue is also a necessary condition of the pursuit of freedom. In other words, freedom must be pursued for the common good, and when it is abused for the benefit of one group at the expense of others, such abuse must be checked. Still, confronted with a choice of more security or more liberty, conservatives will usually opt for more liberty.

"Ordered liberty" is often discussed by conservatives, following Edmund Burke, to distinguish liberty from licentiousness (see, for example, Patrick Deneen). But we can distinguish between liberty as it describes a political community in itself and the members of a community, i.e. political self-rule versus individual "sovereignty." One can have the former without the latter, if that sort of liberty is identified with complete self-rule (or autonomy). Those who rule in a polity should be qualified to do so on the basis of virtue.

How much liberty is necessary for the members of a community? There should be freedom from government interference with legitimate activities or the abuse of authority (legislating in those areas where it has no competence); subsidiarity vs. micromanaging.

Is the conception of liberalism given here one that is more allied to "voluntaristic" notions of law and will rather than a "rationalist" notions? Is there a sense of liberty which is not tied to certain errors which nonetheless retains the importance given to the limits upon human authority? I think so - but one must still show how the different meanings of "uncoerced" can be related with one another. (Freedom can also mean faculty or the potency to some action?)
At the end the author writes: "Conservatives advocate free market capitalism, less regulation of economic activity, and fiscal responsibility." "Free-market" conservatism. The essay is representative of the conservatism articulated by ISI. I would have to say that such a statement of principles is not sufficient as it is not explicitly tied to any particular conception of the human good (or goods).

Related: The Principles of True Politics
On Ordered Liberty A Treatise on the Free Society
Bradley J. Birzer, The Meaning of Liberty During the American Revolution (part 2)

Camera Lucida: Presidential Family Portraits

While a critical examination on the family background of a presidential candidate (or the present resident of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue) may be valid in so far it is an influence upon, and an extension of, that person's character, it is unlikely to be an effective attack that would persuade voters, given how permissive society has become, especially young people. Plenty of things could be said about the mother, but the feminists and the white knights would get upset and claim that this was unfair. If you are going to run for high office why shouldn't you be prepared to have your family life and background scrutinized? No one is born an adult.

It's bad enough that there are people who proudly display Obama 2008 bumper stickers on their cars, but the morons who have Obama 2012 stickers? Have you been paying attention to what your man in the Oval Office has been doing (or not been doing)? They deserve pity and contempt. Women for Obama? Another sign that the franchise was wrongly given to them. It may be difficult to argue that the enfranchisement of women is a violation of of distributive justice without also claiming that universal franchise for males is [probably] unjust. But the latter can be justified insofar as men are the head of families, and politics is in part ordering the affairs not just of individuals but of families, the basic cell of society. (Those men who have attained the other necessary qualifications but are unmarried not through their own fault should be allowed to participate as well, though the sort of knowledge required to know whether it a particular man's fault or vice which keeps him single is probably available only through local networks. All the more reason to have the actual conferral of citizenship done at the local level, even if standards are issued by the state.)

The continuing rebellion against God and nature...

It is the function of men to cooperate for the good of the group. It is the function of women to be the helpmates of men (and to nurture the familial and communal networks accordingly).

Natural resources, again

And ownership...

How are natural resources common? (1) Intended for the benefit of all? (And therefore to be shared by all or apportioned to all.) Or (2) common in so far as they are not claimed by anyone? In which case they (a) belong in potency to everyone or anyone, or (b) belong in actuality to everyone until they are apportioned to someone through property claims/rights?

I'm thinking of not just fossil fuels, oil and coal, but other, more basic natural resources -- fresh water, [arable] land, plants and trees -- these do not appear to be uniformly distributed across the planet. Is it the case that how they are to be distributed should be left to the market, and to contracts between individuals or groups, and thus governed only by commutative justice, with property rights being given to those who have first possession? Or should distributive justice also play a role in determining property rights, with only labor for extraction and processing covered by commutative justice?

Or do fossil fuels differ from other natural resources because they are such immense stores of energy and more important/valuable in that respect?

How are claims of ownership to be adjudicated if not "first come, first have," or "finders, keepers"?

I could imagine these considerations being used to defend the need for a world government, in order for there to be an 'equitable' distribution of resources.

Something to reflect upon again: the right to refuse service and the right of association

Men and the group

The Private Man's post An Ugly Social Expectation And More On Female Projection was timely, as I was thinking about how men and women think about fulfillment and satisfaction. Men do look to the role they fulfill within their group (and with respect to other men) -- finding "satisfying" or "meaningful" work today is a pale shadow of this, while our soldiers seem to have a better experience of this primordial masculine need.* A man in his 40s may be fine without a family, but if he does not have satisfying work he will experience spiritual difficulties. In contrast, [most] women, especially as they get older, feel empty without a husband and children. Many women who were influenced by feminism to put career ahead of relationships are now regretting being single and 30-something.

By their natural inclinations, women seem to depend primarily on the family and the role they occupy with respect to the family (both immediate and extended) for happiness. Their other social roles (with neighbors, people who are not-family) are extensions of the feminine self. The single woman (who is not dedicated to some form of the religious life) must find roles that supplement her familial role and replace those of wife and mother.

For a man, on the other hand, being a husband and father is part of his social role(s), which can be more abstract, while those of the woman are focused on concrete personal relationships. (Patriotism and military service can be built upon rather thin notions of community and identity.) Men who have been shut out of political participation and communal life can focus their energies on doing what they can with respect to their family (and neighbors) but this is not the highest form of civic life. It is what men are reduced to doing in a system that is hostile to them and tradition. It seems to me that a man who otherwise focuses exclusively on his family for meaning may be under the influence of excessive sentimentality, ideology, or a bias towards the family that leads to the neglect of his duties to the community.


Women are criticized for their herd instinct -- acquiescing in group think in order to belong. Men do have a "group mentality" and when this is faulty or unhealthy they too will "go along to get along" but it is nonetheless the foundation of functioning within a community.


Saying that men and women are complementary may be accurate in some ways, but taken too far is it just a "nice" way to ignore the real differences  between men and women and the roles they play (especially with respect to the exercise of authority within the family and society)? One sometimes gets the impression from certain churchmen that women can and should do everything that men can do, in addition to being a mother (which men cannot be)!

Should Genesis be used to support a traditional understanding of the roles of husband and wife? Some contemporary Catholics might reject such an exegesis out of hand as being outdated and contrary to their feminist inclinations. But if the first woman was created to be a helpmate to the first man, and not vice versa, shouldn't that mean something, especially if it is confirmed in the yearnings of women themselves?

*While it would be wrong to discount the experience of comrades in arms, this brotherhood does have its limitations. Sebastian Junger and others have said that soldiers do not care about the personal lives of others, so long as they do their job properly. I have some who were in combat units express that they do not care if someone is a homosexual, but this is presumably so long as homosexuals keep this aspect to themselves. But victory  (or the brotherhood of soldiers) is not the only good to be pursued by men. While private behaviors may not matter so much on the battlefield, it would be incorrect to extend this sort of non-judgmentalism to deliberation concerning communal life at large. Victory is not for its own sake, but for the sake of the community (hence Aristotle's criticism of Sparta), and just because certain behaviors do not get in the way of victory does not mean that they therefore ok for the communal life. I am not referring just to homosexuality, but to almost anything that does not pertain to war-making. Soldiers may be too focused on war to judge things correctly with respect to the community or the common good.

John Médaille, Distributism and the political economy

Respublica

If an economy is to achieve equilibrium, that rough balance between supply and demand upon which orderly markets depend, then obviously there must be sufficient demand distributed through the mass of men to clear the markets. Since most men do not have sufficient productive property to make their own way in the world, the mass of goods must be distributed to the mass of men by wages. And for this to work, there must be a certain justice in the wage; if the workers get a declining share of the output, markets will fail; there will not be enough purchasing power to clear the markets, and they will have to be supplemented by government spending or by consumer lending. But both of these are temporary fixes, at best, which merely delay the collapse rather than mend it. Mending the situation requires us to fix the wage system itself.

Wages are a part of distributive justice, which deals with how to distribute the output of some social enterprise, be it a state, a firm, or a family. Distributism is the political economy which explores the effects of distributive justice on the economic order. It is the claim of the distributists that justice is central to the economic question. When we speak of remoralizing the markets, as Phillip Blond puts it, we are not talking about adding something to an already complete science of economics; rather, we are speaking of something which is central to political economy and without which the science cannot be complete.

We usually think that wages pertain to commutative justice... something to reconsider, especially their relationship to natural resources (which are common) and labor (which seems to not be common).

A question about the Church and Universal Suffrage

Has the Church ever endorsed universal suffrage?

The Church does not endorse any particular form of government (in particular, the forms of government enumerated by the ancients and considered by the medievals -- monarchy, aristocracy, or polity). It only requires that government serve the common good (rather than the private good of those who are ruling).
A quick search reminded me of this post at Ite ad Thomam. Talking about who is qualified to participate in ruling and who is not is implicitly tied to claims about distributive justice. I don't see the Magisterium coming out with a statement supporting [absolute] universal suffrage (which ignores the question of whether one is morally qualified to rule or not) when this would be contrary to distributive justice. (Individual bishops and priests may do so, but I would claim that they do not have adequate support from Tradition or reason. Praise of liberal democracy exists, even at the highest levels, but it is, as far as I remember, limited and conditional.)

Still, even if the Church hasn't endorsed universal suffrage, it may maintain that in communities where it exists, Catholic citizens have a duty to exercise citizenship (to participate in elections and so on). Power should be used if it is given to one, even if he does not deserve it, for not using would be failing to prevent others from misusing it? However, what if he cannot exercise it well? What if Catholic citizens perceive that they are not qualified to vote, because they are not well informed of the issues or candidates? Not only can they opt out of voting, but would it be morally necessary for them to do so?

What of the apparent paradox that the knowledge that one is not qualified is founded upon the knowledge of what is necessary to be qualified, and those who have this fundamental knowledge are thereby qualified? We would have to break this down and look at what is actually known and to see if it is the same in all three cases. In the first, one may have opinion or moral science of who should be a citizen, but the most important qualification of a citizen is his virtue: the moral virtues including prudence or practical wisdom, which are not identical with opinion and moral science.

Something related:
Here is an article in the NY Times from the last century, in which a Catholic priest defends giving women the right to vote.

Why does The American Catholic have a layout that is similar to Vox Nova's? Some of the comments by certain Vox Novatians to Joe Hargrave's "Enough is Enough: The Crusades & The Jihad Are Not Equivalents" have been amusing. Yes, the Church teaches that murder is wrong and not to be done, but the killing that is done by those pursuing a just war is not murder. Also, moral theologians have distinguished between the just killing that is done in war from that which is done in self-defense -- the former is "intentional" or "direct" while the latter is permissible through the principle of double-effect, it cannot be directly intended. (Aquinas's treatment of war in the ST.) Is this a problem with the CCC or with the one reading it?

The difference in strength between men and women may be greater than you think.

In The Angels principle, Mr. Richardson refers to this blog entry's citation of an article by David Puts:

When fat-free mass is considered, men are 40% heavier (Lassek & Gaulin, 2009; Mayhew & Salm, 1990) and have 60% more total lean muscle mass than women. Men have 80% greater arm muscle mass and 50% more lower body muscle mass (Abe, Kearns, & Fukunaga, 2003). Lassek and Gaulin (2009) note that the sex difference in upper-body muscle mass in humans is similar to the sex difference in fat-free mass in gorillas (Zihlman & MacFarland, 2000), the most sexually dimorphic of all living primates.


These differences in muscularity translate into large differences in strength and speed. Men have about 90% greater upper-body strength, a difference of approximately three standard deviations (Abe et al., 2003; Lassek & Gaulin, 2009). The average man is stronger than 99.9% of women (Lassek & Gaulin, 2009). Men also have about 65% greater lower body strength (Lassek & Gaulin, 2009; Mayhew & Salm, 1990), over 45% higher vertical leap, and over 22% faster sprint times (Mayhew & Salm, 1990).


(Puts, David, A. “Beauty and the Beast: Mechanisms of Sexual Selection in Humans.” Evolution & Human Behavior 31.3 (2010): 157-75.)

abstract


So why should women be serving as firefighters and LEOs? Strength-training for women is limited by the material. If you have two LEOs trying to subdue a suspect, do you want two men or one man and one woman?

Democratic equality

America divided: the politics of inequality by Godfrey Hodgson (archived at EB)

Since this author and others live in the United States, it is understandable that they would talk and think in terms of "democracy" -- if they were to talk about aristocracy, they would lose readers. (Only paleoconservatives or traditional conservatives would be susceptible to supporting a historical aristocracy.)

From the essay:

The persistence of large-scale unemployment is a standing affront to another of America’s core ideas: that, as the country’s founding document says, all men are created equal. True, the signatories of the Declaration of Independence were here pledging fidelity to a natural-rights principle than thinking of absolute or even relative economic equality.

Classical liberalism works to the advantage of the haves, while modern liberalism is a reaction to that, and can be understood as a attempt, however misguided, to protect the have-nots? Each focuses on equality, but different sorts. Still, the author is reading an incorrect understanding of equality into the Declaration of Independence. I believe that this sort of equality is not discussed by Aristotle or Plato as a claim in support of democracy -- rather it is the fact that one is free that entitles one to participate in ruling. Those are free are equal in this respect, and this equality suffices for their claims to have a share in government.

It seems to me that the author, like other Democrats, presuppose the continuation of a system predicated on infinite economic growth. There is a disparity of wealth, but that number (personal or family wealth) taken in abstraction from living conditions, standards of living, and so on, can be misleading, and it ignores other forms of poverty (spiritual and social poverty).

Sometimes the difference between "conservatives" and "liberals" is stated as an opposition between equality of opportunity and equality of results. But if both violate distributive justice (and maybe even commutative justice), that does not prevent the distributist from advocating that all own the means of production. It does not preclude the distributist from recognizing that some may have more at the beginning of production, or end up with more after sales. But there will be a limit to the difference that is possible?

It may be that not all are able to exercise complete economic freedom, as defined by Belloc. But even those who are employed in the service of social and political superiors can have households that produce much of the goods that they consume. (As I suspect was the case in in the manor system and medieval feudalism in general?)

One more point about Politics III, 3

Jowett's translation:

...[F]or even supposing that such a community were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as before their union. It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life.

I was thinking of communities in which racial or ethnic segregation exists -- can they really be called "communities," except equivocally? In the South, there was no intermarriage allowed, along with minor forms of segregation in public places, segregation of schools, and so on. If members of another group are not treated as members of a political community (and are not slaves or have not been deprived of citizenship or the rights to participate in political life as some punishment), then how can they be subject to the laws of that community? I am not claiming that citizens must explicitly consent to a law before it can be promulgated. But even if they have citizenship and are "represented," if they are not treated as members of the community then isn't there a problem with consistency? (No, since the states were forced by the Federal Government to give blacks the right to vote. But this, along with Reconstruction, and the consequences of the Civil Rights Act, show that attempts by the Federal government to eradicate racism cannot succeed. This must be accomplished from within those societies.)

If, for example, most whites did not want to associate with blacks or treat them as "their own," shouldn't they have let the blacks go their own way, forming their own communities and governments? But in this fallen world, who would let this happen? People want to hold on to their territory, even if they have more than enough land to satisfy their needs. (I'll leave aside the historical question of how many whites were actually racist and how many just acquiesced to the state of things.)

Is there anything more to society within liberal/social contract theory than what Aristotle would call alliances between individuals for mutual benefit? A theory about the origin, nature, and purpose of government that is predicated upon what can be only called barbarism (the acceptance of the moral idiot -- the individual without any deep social ties and obligations -- as the norm) cannot but be deficient.

Or is there more to social contract theory than this?

For more on racial discrimination, see this and this.

Voting

On Thursday's Open Q&A on Catholic Answers Live (rm, mp3), a question was raised about voting and Colin B. Donovan supported the position that it was better to cast one's vote for the "lesser of two evils" than for the "good man" who has no chance of being elected. Rather than give a summary, I will instead transcribe what was said:

[Caller (Casey)]: "The question I have is kinda theoretical, but it has some practical applications. It's something a buddy of mine and I have been arguing about a couple of years now... it's an argument about the obligation a Catholic has while voting."

[Mr. Donovan] Right.

[Casey] For instance he is set up with these three possible candidates. I mean, go back to 2008, where you had Obama, who is violently anti-life; you got McCain, who is kinda wishy-washy. But then you did have an option where they were staunchly pro-life. The question is, are you obligated to vote for someone who has the right views, but doesn't really have a good chance of getting elected... I mean' it's not a practical vote.

[Mr. Donovan] Yeah, it's much clearer when you have two people. There's a long moral theology tradition that you can find that you can find in any collections of moral theologians over the decades, centuries even, that you can chose or you ought to choose the lesser of two evils. Whatever will serve the common good.

[Casey] Right, kinda like the principle of double effect idea.

[Mr. Donovan] Essentially, I mean, what you are are doing is you are choosing them for the good effect that you are at minimum preventing a worse candidate from getting in there, even though you are not embracing some of their positions, and you are only tolerating them. This has been wrongly, very wrongly, interpreted as you can vote for a pro-abortion candidate if the alternative is somebody who has some other things that are contrary to Catholic teaching. And that's the whole debate of course between the whole Bush-Gore, Bush-Obama debate was, well. If you think the war is unjust, do you have a right to say, well I want to vote for Obama, or for Gore or whoever it is, because they are not pro-war, even though they are pro-abortion. When you stack up the positions, what is intrinsically evil versus what is a political judgment, there really was no debate, reasonably, although some attempted to say that there was. So when you have two candidates it's pretty, I think you usually have a clear choice, if you look at the critical issues of those who support intrinsic evils, such as stem-cell research, abortion, and homosexual marriage and so on, versus those who may on prudential judgments you disagree with them. And that's often the case.

Now when you have three, I think most theologians and the bishops even who have spoken on it, are prepared to give some latitude to people to say that, sure you do not want to be responsible for bad candidate #1 getting in because you vote for good candidate #3. Now you can certainly, very easily see the argument, well if I vote for the straight-line pro-life candidate, then the worse of the two other candidates will get in. And do you want to be morally responsible for that? I think that has got to weigh on the consciences of people. But most theologians and the bishops who I have mentioned do, at least I think, understand that for some people they simply cannot swallow hard enough to vote for either 1 or 2, and they want to vote for the third.

So I don't think there is any, I think that they, a voter, a Catholic voter should seriously think of abandoning an electable candidate, weaknesses he may have, in favor of the lily-pure candidate, such as they think he is, or she, even though that candidate has no chance being elected. Because after all, politics is a practical thing. It's not meant to, we're not going to set up paradise on earth after all.

[Casey] Utopia doesn't exist.

[Mr. Donovan] Yes, you're not gonna have have Utopia. The one bad thing Thomas More wrote, probably, was about utopia.

(This begins at about the 23:25 mark in the program.)

By the way, St. Thomas More actually is the patron saint of statesmen and politicans.

So it would appear that Mr. Donovan endorse the position that one should vote for the lesser of two evils, in order to prevent the worse candidate from winning. It is almost like a form of consequentialism that attributes to the external act no moral status. It is not clear to me whether Mr. Donovan actually has an opinion about whether the act of voting is instrinsically moral or not. But since it deals with others or the community, it pertains either to particular justice or general justice, or both. Which is it? I doubt that moral theologians have talked about voting for more than several centuries, since mass democracy is relatively recent. As for the bishops... I'd have to see an actual statement or two in order to know what they are actually saying with respect to voting.

At least he did not use the saying "Politics as the art of the possible," to justify this position. The saying is usually understood as being applicable to legislators, or to the different branches/officers of government, who must compromise with one another, not to voters, who participate in politics only in so far as they choose those who are to serve in office, but no more.

People generally select candidates based solely on issues and what they promise to do in office (along with experience and reputation), rather than actual knowledge of their character. Is this the same as thinking that government should reflect the will of the people? Do people see voting as a delegation of authority, rather than selecting (or endorsing) someone who is qualified to rule?

Regarding the comment about consciences: Who is responsible for bad legislation? Those who have the power to enact legislation, the legislators. Not the voters. Who is responsible for getting bad people into office? Not those who refrain from voting (because their vote won't make a difference), or vote for a third-party candidate instead of the candidate from the other part of the duopoly. Rather, only those who vote for those bad candidates are responsible. (Mr. Donovan is not taking this position, that voters who "enable" bad candidates to take office because they do not vote for the competitor who is not so bad are somehow morally culpable of putting them in office, but a committed consequentialist would make this argument.)

Aristotle discusses who is qualified to rule in his Politics. I believe that he claims that the
is a question of justice. Although he does not explicitly say it belongs to that justice involved with distributions, I believe that distributive justice is involved because the good involved is common, namely that of rulilng the community, and this is to be apportioned to one, a few, or many. Who should rule, according to Aristotle? The virtuous -- only they have a just claim to hold office.

If this is the case, then isn't one bound in distributive justice to vote only for those who are qualified for office? To give office to someone who is not qualified (lacks virtue) is counter to distributive justice and facilitates a bad regime coming into existence. If it is intrinsically unjust to vote for someone who is not qualified for office, even if he is not as bad as another candidate, then even if we can bring about a "better" outcome by electing him, it is still wrong. ("The ends do not justify the means.") Aristotle's virtue is not just right belief (or having the right platform), or even the science of politics -- it is complete set of virtues, all of which are interconnected through reason.

If someone endorses the wrong positions, or defends the wrong ends, does that give us enough of an indication as to what his personal character is like? We would be mistaken to think that someone who is "sincere" in his beliefs cannot be vicious. But how do we evaluate a politician who rejects traditional morality as being binding on all and foundational to society, but does not appear to personally act against it?

If we are unable to become acquainted enough with a candidate to know his character because of the size of our polity, should we be voting for him? Rather, we should see if there is an intrinsic problem with the political economy because of its size. If the only candidates who can possibly win are those who lack virtue, or are merely the tools of the rich and powerful, then let us not pretend that we live in a polity or a republic -- we are living in an oligarchy, and our votes do not matter much to begin with.

(Would Aristotle explain that it is beneficial for the many in a polity to be able to select those who hold office because in this case the judgment of the many is better than the judgment of a few?)

If all we have is a knowledge of where a person stands on various issues, perhaps that might suffice, given the current circumstances, to warrant a vote. But it is definitely not ideal.

Participating in electoral politics in a bad regime will probably not change the bad regime, because all regimes seek their own preservation, and thus the system is set up accordingly . (Which is not to say that the virtuous man should disobey them.) If there is to be positive change, it must be accomplished through other means.


Notes:
As voters, is our concern with backing someone who is most likely to bring about the common good? Or do we need to focus on determining who is virtuous? What is the nature of our obligation to promote the common good relative to participating in elections?

Instead of expecting a definite plan of action, should we be satisfied that a candidate knows what goods to secure for the community? Should we trust the virtuous man to compromise in the right way, rather than the unknown man who promises to bring about the legislative changes you want?

A reminder that an atomistic community is no community at all:

This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and Megara, to be brought together so that their walls touched, still they would not be one city, not even if the citizens had the right to intermarry, which is one of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if men dwelt at a distance from one another, but not so far off as to have no intercourse, and there were laws among them that they should not wrong each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have nothing in common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not constitute a state. Why is this? Surely not because they are at a distance from one another: for even supposing that such a community were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as before their union. It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life. (Politics, III.3)

"With great power comes great responsibility."

This is the often quoted line spoken by Uncle Ben to Peter Parker in the first Spiderman movie, and inspires the gawky teenager to become a vigilante hero. (Will this line be repeated in the reboot?) Someone quoted it this morning [2/24] on one of the country music stations.

Conservatives may try to save rights language by coupling rights with duties or responsibilities -- "rights entail responsibilities," similar to the joining of liberty to responsibility. (They are identical if right is defined as the [moral] freedom to do x.) If liberty is by definition indeterminate with respect to the good, then it must be "compelled" [from without] to embrace the good or to be used "correctly." (The will is indifferent to good and evil acts in so far as it can choose either, but it is perfected by the former and not by the latter.)

In this post I won't be discussing rights and liberties, but only abilities and powers, and whether we can be required by law to use them for others. Even liberals can give some assent to the claim that we should act, or exercise our abilities responsibly. A superhero is not good because he does great things with his abilities, although children may think that way. Rather, great power requires great virtue for it to be exercised well and not poorly, or for evil purposes. A superhero must overcome not just evil people, but the temptation within to do evil. But Uncle Ben is saying more than this: those who have great power have a responsibility to use that to benefit others. Certainly this is the lesson that Peter Parker learns. Peter corrects his first realization that his failure to stop the robber cost his uncle his life. He comes to see that since he was there had the power to stop the criminal, he should have done something, and this was good for its own sake.

But in a liberal society, how can the linking of power with duty or responsibility be justified, if individual autonomy is the ultimate value? The liberal government may prohibit us from using our powers to harm others, but can it require that we use them for the sake of the good of others or ourselves? If I am better than you in some way, why should that fact alone entail that I should be required to exert a greater effort so that my ability is used to its fullest? And if a government should command me to do so, would that not be a violation of my rights? Even if I am stronger than you, why should a carry something heavier? Why shouldn't everyone be carrying the same or equal weight? That seems like equality to me. (This argument is often made by those who advocate everyone being taxed the same amount?)

A liberal state may be able to compel its members to defend it if it is under attack, because individuals can better attain their good with it than without. (Or, since individuals would have to defend themselves regardless, their chances of survival may be increased if they work together than by themselves. But what if the individual is ordered to sacrifice himself?) This is an emergency situation -- what if the community is not in immediate danger, and its survival is at risk? By what right can the state command me to do more to promote my well-being and that of others, whether it is because I have greater abilities than others or because I am not using all of my rather limited talents?

(If I am a citizen in a "democracy" and I vote or support such a law, then I am merely codifying what I have already chosen for myself. If I oppose such a law... then as a liberal I can argue that the state has no right to create this law.)

We may "intuitively" agree with Uncle Ben's statement, so how do we justify it? It seems to be something that is required, though not necessarily by positive law. If it were required by positive law, the civil government would be the author of the law, and our obedience to its authority would come into play. But we may grasp that this requirement is just, even if there is no human law to lay it out for us. We may understand that it is required for the sake of the common good or because of an even higher authority (Luke 12:48). If it is the former, then it seems we can by the use of our reason understand the demands of distributive justice upon us, just as the natural law commands us to use all of our abilities for the good of the community. It is distributive justice that justifies unequal burdens for unequals.

Because it does not admit that man has a social end or that there is a common good distinct from man's private good, liberalism appears to be unable to give a reason for the state to issue such laws. Rather, liberalism would have to prohibit this sort of legislation.

This gets me thinking -- how does the liberal justify taxation for the purpose of redistribution? As a means of avoiding conflict between the haves and haves-not? For some abstract notion of equality? Do liberals have a notion of distributive justice that can be harmonized with a more traditional notion?



Started on February 24.