Unz Review
Has Gottfried used the rhetoric of the "more advanced race" before?
Should have guessed that Unz Review would become the HBD alternative to AmCon.
Showing posts with label voting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label voting. Show all posts
Monday, January 19, 2015
Friday, November 02, 2012
Tuesday, Tuesday
Qualified Write-In Candidates for President/VP in California include:
Virgil Goode/James Clymer (Constitution Party)
Ron Paul/Andrew Napolitano
Gary Johnson is on the ballot for the Libertarian Party. Decisions, decisions.
Virgil Goode/James Clymer (Constitution Party)
Ron Paul/Andrew Napolitano
Gary Johnson is on the ballot for the Libertarian Party. Decisions, decisions.
TAC: Conservative Vote: Round 2
Five more principled conservatives tell us how they're voting. (via CHT) - CHT has their own symposium. (I was interested in what Michael Cushman and Michael Hill had to say.)
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
American Conservative Symposium on the Election
The Conservative Vote: A Symposium
PJB voices his opinion here. Daniel Larison adds some personal notes, and he also has this post: Replacing the Congressional GOP’s Leadership.
PJB voices his opinion here. Daniel Larison adds some personal notes, and he also has this post: Replacing the Congressional GOP’s Leadership.
Friday, October 19, 2012
Wednesday, October 17, 2012
Pius XII on Voting
There is a photo of Pope Pius XII with these words:
(EWTN)
I think we must distinguish between voting for laws and voting for candidates, and in the latter case, between situations in which one has enough information to make an informed choice and one in which one does not. We should vote when there is a clear choice that has a direct impact on a law being passed, or when we know the candidates well enough that we know they differ significantly in character. The more distant you are from the question of actual legislation, the less this precept holds.
I think that this reading can be fitted to the allocution, as this is what precedes the above:
A more mainstream interpretation, emphasizing that there is duty to vote: What Keeps Me Catholic? Civic Responsibility. Google Search will probably yield some more results in which this interpretation is advanced (like this and this), but I think it would be a premature reading of the Holy Pontiff's words.
It may be that my reading of Pius XII is too narrow, and that he refers to the choosing of candidates for office as well. Are his words to be taken absolutely? Or do we acknowledge their weight and seek confirmation from Tradition? There is no constant witness to the Church on the question of voting in modern nation-states, as it is a relatively recent development in the history of the world. So we must reason from more general principles of moral and political theology.
Of course, there is also section 2240 in the CCC (as pointed out in this thread), which states that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. But I find "voting" here to be vague as well. If it encompasses voting for both laws and candidates, then I have to disagree, though I may judged to be wrong. Kyrie eleison.
Of course, during this presidential election, Catholics aren't the only ones who are talking about the duty to vote.
Ranger Up:
There is a heavy responsibility on everyone, man or woman, who has the right to vote, especially when the interests of religion are at stake; abstention in this case is in itself, it should be thoroughly understood, a grave and a fatal sin of omission. On the contrary, to exercise, and exercise well, one's right to vote is to work effectively for the true good of the people, as loyal defenders of the cause of God and of the Church.The words are taken from Papal Directives for the Woman of Today, Allocution of Pope Pius XII to the Congress of the International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues, Rome, Italy, September 11, 1947.
(EWTN)
I think we must distinguish between voting for laws and voting for candidates, and in the latter case, between situations in which one has enough information to make an informed choice and one in which one does not. We should vote when there is a clear choice that has a direct impact on a law being passed, or when we know the candidates well enough that we know they differ significantly in character. The more distant you are from the question of actual legislation, the less this precept holds.
I think that this reading can be fitted to the allocution, as this is what precedes the above:
Be present everywhere for the faith, for Christ, in every way and to the utmost possible limit, wherever vital interests are at stake, wherever laws bearing on the worship of God, marriage, the family, the school, the social order are proposed and discussed.Why do so many people act surprised when politicians lie or break their promises? You didn't know them well enough to begin with to judge them to be trustworthy and reliable.
A more mainstream interpretation, emphasizing that there is duty to vote: What Keeps Me Catholic? Civic Responsibility. Google Search will probably yield some more results in which this interpretation is advanced (like this and this), but I think it would be a premature reading of the Holy Pontiff's words.
It may be that my reading of Pius XII is too narrow, and that he refers to the choosing of candidates for office as well. Are his words to be taken absolutely? Or do we acknowledge their weight and seek confirmation from Tradition? There is no constant witness to the Church on the question of voting in modern nation-states, as it is a relatively recent development in the history of the world. So we must reason from more general principles of moral and political theology.
Of course, there is also section 2240 in the CCC (as pointed out in this thread), which states that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. But I find "voting" here to be vague as well. If it encompasses voting for both laws and candidates, then I have to disagree, though I may judged to be wrong. Kyrie eleison.
Of course, during this presidential election, Catholics aren't the only ones who are talking about the duty to vote.
Ranger Up:
Sunday, October 14, 2012
Where's Francis Urquhart When You Need Him
We are arguably the most profligate country in history. Choosing the candidate put forth by the duopoly who will enable that that profligacy will be continued? That's supposed to be a plan for the future?
I will grant that one party is worse than the other with respect to actively advancing an agenda destructive of traditional morals and community. But the Republicans will do nothing to stop or turn it back.
Edit.
The Dangerous Alliance of Big Government and Big Business by David Masciotra
I find that the homepage for FPR is not updating properly. The newest articles and posts are not being shown. Is anyone else seeing this?
I will grant that one party is worse than the other with respect to actively advancing an agenda destructive of traditional morals and community. But the Republicans will do nothing to stop or turn it back.
Edit.
The Dangerous Alliance of Big Government and Big Business by David Masciotra
I find that the homepage for FPR is not updating properly. The newest articles and posts are not being shown. Is anyone else seeing this?
Friday, October 12, 2012
A Rejoinder to Straussians and Traditionalist Catholics
Both groups have accepted the Yankee nationalist myth, with the traditionalists criticizing the American founding accordingly.
Traditionalists see the United States as a "product of the Enlightenment" under the belief that rights can only be understood within the framework of liberalism, not as curbs on human legislative authority for a different reason. In this case, the Bill of Rights is a curb on the authority of the Federal Government. They do not acknowledge that the United States are more than the federal system.
Virtue, Wisdom, Experience, Not Abstract Rights, Form the Basis of the American Republic by Gregory S. Ahern
Catholics criticize the current political economy as a liberal one, probably rightly so, but it is not wholly liberal in its origin. (I will posit for now that it was inspired both by liberalism and some form of republicanism, even if that republicanism may have been deficient.) What do they offer as a solution, whether they be traditionalists or those associated with the left? CST! If everyone would just follow CST things would be better. But they've missed a big step - there can be no reorganization of community because what association that exists in most Uhmerican places are not communities. Communities must be formed from scratch, and this requires time and circumspection on the part of those involved, as they test one another. One should make laws to prevent injustice from happening, but CST is probably not a solution, not until other things are in place. The powers that be, the oligarchy, will ensure that the status quo is maintained. We can only do what we can to work outside of their system.
On voting:
Andew Haines, A Vote Worth Casting: What Makes Voting Valuable? (via CFPML)
He continues his examination of voting in line of MacIntyre's somewhat famous admonition to abstain.
The Moral Duty to (Not) Vote. Voting is an exercise of distributive justice that is dependent upon knowing the character of the candidates and their qualifications to hold office. The exercise of good practical reason should take into account whether one wells a candidate well enough to judge them to be suitable or not. Being a voter should be as serious as being a member of the Mafia: for whom can you vouch? While the personal consequences of making a bad endorsement may not be as great, a bad officer-holder can contribute to the ruin of a political community. I think Haines is on the right track, but he does not bring up the question of the proper scale or size of a community as Aristotle does (and Aristotelians worth the name do).
Haines questions, against Pahman, whether there can be a duty to consider the consequences?
"Not, of course, because considering probabilities is somehow unrelated to performing valuable actions—I argue that informed judgments are the only sort worth anything to begin with. Rather, it’s because introducing “duty” language into a thoroughly intellectual activity just doesn’t make sense."
Here I think Haines is probably wrong - if there are precepts concerning the virtue of prudence, then there are duties pertaining to prudence, and the citizen is obligated to act (and reason) prudently with respect to the affairs of the community.
Traditionalists see the United States as a "product of the Enlightenment" under the belief that rights can only be understood within the framework of liberalism, not as curbs on human legislative authority for a different reason. In this case, the Bill of Rights is a curb on the authority of the Federal Government. They do not acknowledge that the United States are more than the federal system.
Virtue, Wisdom, Experience, Not Abstract Rights, Form the Basis of the American Republic by Gregory S. Ahern
Catholics criticize the current political economy as a liberal one, probably rightly so, but it is not wholly liberal in its origin. (I will posit for now that it was inspired both by liberalism and some form of republicanism, even if that republicanism may have been deficient.) What do they offer as a solution, whether they be traditionalists or those associated with the left? CST! If everyone would just follow CST things would be better. But they've missed a big step - there can be no reorganization of community because what association that exists in most Uhmerican places are not communities. Communities must be formed from scratch, and this requires time and circumspection on the part of those involved, as they test one another. One should make laws to prevent injustice from happening, but CST is probably not a solution, not until other things are in place. The powers that be, the oligarchy, will ensure that the status quo is maintained. We can only do what we can to work outside of their system.
On voting:
Andew Haines, A Vote Worth Casting: What Makes Voting Valuable? (via CFPML)
He continues his examination of voting in line of MacIntyre's somewhat famous admonition to abstain.
The Moral Duty to (Not) Vote. Voting is an exercise of distributive justice that is dependent upon knowing the character of the candidates and their qualifications to hold office. The exercise of good practical reason should take into account whether one wells a candidate well enough to judge them to be suitable or not. Being a voter should be as serious as being a member of the Mafia: for whom can you vouch? While the personal consequences of making a bad endorsement may not be as great, a bad officer-holder can contribute to the ruin of a political community. I think Haines is on the right track, but he does not bring up the question of the proper scale or size of a community as Aristotle does (and Aristotelians worth the name do).
Haines questions, against Pahman, whether there can be a duty to consider the consequences?
"Not, of course, because considering probabilities is somehow unrelated to performing valuable actions—I argue that informed judgments are the only sort worth anything to begin with. Rather, it’s because introducing “duty” language into a thoroughly intellectual activity just doesn’t make sense."
Here I think Haines is probably wrong - if there are precepts concerning the virtue of prudence, then there are duties pertaining to prudence, and the citizen is obligated to act (and reason) prudently with respect to the affairs of the community.
Saturday, September 08, 2012
Wednesday, August 15, 2012
"Engagement" or "Withdrawal"?
Natural Law and Positive Law: A Response to Thomas Storck by Dylan Pahman (Mr. Storck's essay, "Natural Law, Politics, and the Transformation of America")
What has participation in "movement conservatism" yielded for traditional conservatives on the national level? How can one appeal to natural law, or "naturally known" moral truths on a wide scale (through the mass media, no less) to facilitate moral conversion? Has that ever happened in history? The freedom to participate in an extremely degraded version of democracy gives the illusion that Christians have the power to bring about positive change through the National Government; this is coupled with a misunderstanding of the obligations of citizenship, namely, that one has the "duty" to choose the "lesser of two evils" when voting for a candidate for office (which is a consequentialist understanding of voting and not one rooted in distributive justice) if no one meets the "ideal" based on his platform (as opposed to his character). When the national candidates are committed to perpetuating the status quo and not facilitating communal renewal by curbing the forces that threaten community (whether it be the oligarchs and their economic power or their servants in the National Government who seek greater power for themselves), then what exactly do Christians expect to accomplish? Imposing a moral agenda through the Federal Government not only violates the federal character of the U.S. Constitution but is impossible - the electoral power of Christians is too weak and diffuse.
Mr. Pahman writes:
Civil servant or bureaucrat? If a bureaucrat is enforcing bad laws that destroy freedom (and subsidarity and community), can one continue in good conscience? The lay vocation of the Christian is to build community, starting with his family and church community, then expanding outwards to his non-Christian neighbors and those around him. This has been constant, but we have been blinded because we have been inculturated in radical atomization and an exaggerated notion of the nation-state (which has either knowingly or unknowingly done what it can to destroy any "intermediate" associations or communities) - hence we identify political participation solely with voting and holding political office. (Performing jury duty is an important component, but how many of us would prefer not to do it because it is deemed inconvenient?) Secondly, the theological virtue pertains to God and our salvation, not to the political community as such. The act of building community is a truly political act - it is not "withdrawal" (just as refraining from interventionism is not isolationism). Ruling may be a more noble political political act, but Christians do not exercise it at the national "level" and in many states they do not do so at the state level. If movement conservatism is to have an impact, it should direct its attention to those states which are still Christian in character and seek to educate their citizens about federalism, states' rights, communitarianism, and so on, rather than promoting "free-market capitalism" which hollows out communities. Do you think movement conservates is capable of turning away the money from donors in the oligarchy and putting themselves out of a job?
Mr. Storck has an excellent response to the article. I think he and Dr. Fleming would be in agreement on the proper strategy for American Catholics and other genuine Christians.
What has participation in "movement conservatism" yielded for traditional conservatives on the national level? How can one appeal to natural law, or "naturally known" moral truths on a wide scale (through the mass media, no less) to facilitate moral conversion? Has that ever happened in history? The freedom to participate in an extremely degraded version of democracy gives the illusion that Christians have the power to bring about positive change through the National Government; this is coupled with a misunderstanding of the obligations of citizenship, namely, that one has the "duty" to choose the "lesser of two evils" when voting for a candidate for office (which is a consequentialist understanding of voting and not one rooted in distributive justice) if no one meets the "ideal" based on his platform (as opposed to his character). When the national candidates are committed to perpetuating the status quo and not facilitating communal renewal by curbing the forces that threaten community (whether it be the oligarchs and their economic power or their servants in the National Government who seek greater power for themselves), then what exactly do Christians expect to accomplish? Imposing a moral agenda through the Federal Government not only violates the federal character of the U.S. Constitution but is impossible - the electoral power of Christians is too weak and diffuse.
Mr. Pahman writes:
While I am sensitive to Storck’s insistence that evangelism deserves renewed zeal for the sake of moral progress in society, I feel his opposition of evangelism rather than political action (or, more accurately, evangelism then political action) is ultimately harmful. In particular, there would seem to be no vocation for the Christian as citizen or civil servant today, no vital service that he/she has to offer to the kingdom of God now in his/her civic capacity before such a widespread evangelization has taken place. Whether or not one or the other is “a more hopeful project” is, furthermore, no reason to discourage the theological virtue of hope or the working of divine grace in either evangelization or political activism, especially in a country like the United States where the average citizen has a far greater civic role to play than citizens of an ancient or medieval monarchy. Both are possible duties and essential contributions to the kingdom of heaven and the common good.And so we see that Mr. Pahman has been beguiled into thinking that the average American has a great "civic role" to play than his ancient or medieval counterparts. This may have been true after independence from Great Britain was obtained, but it has not been true for quite some time.
Civil servant or bureaucrat? If a bureaucrat is enforcing bad laws that destroy freedom (and subsidarity and community), can one continue in good conscience? The lay vocation of the Christian is to build community, starting with his family and church community, then expanding outwards to his non-Christian neighbors and those around him. This has been constant, but we have been blinded because we have been inculturated in radical atomization and an exaggerated notion of the nation-state (which has either knowingly or unknowingly done what it can to destroy any "intermediate" associations or communities) - hence we identify political participation solely with voting and holding political office. (Performing jury duty is an important component, but how many of us would prefer not to do it because it is deemed inconvenient?) Secondly, the theological virtue pertains to God and our salvation, not to the political community as such. The act of building community is a truly political act - it is not "withdrawal" (just as refraining from interventionism is not isolationism). Ruling may be a more noble political political act, but Christians do not exercise it at the national "level" and in many states they do not do so at the state level. If movement conservatism is to have an impact, it should direct its attention to those states which are still Christian in character and seek to educate their citizens about federalism, states' rights, communitarianism, and so on, rather than promoting "free-market capitalism" which hollows out communities. Do you think movement conservates is capable of turning away the money from donors in the oligarchy and putting themselves out of a job?
Mr. Storck has an excellent response to the article. I think he and Dr. Fleming would be in agreement on the proper strategy for American Catholics and other genuine Christians.
Monday, July 23, 2012
Lesser of Two Evils Thinking Even Among the Intellectuals
Obama’s Right Wing by Michael Brendan Dougherty
If one is a public intellectual or an academic talking about politics, can they do anything but preach participation in the system? A consistent localism that recognizes the futility of reforming the Federal Government through elections would also recognize the uselessness of most academic institutions, think tanks, and any political movement that is trying to effect change through voting.
If one is a public intellectual or an academic talking about politics, can they do anything but preach participation in the system? A consistent localism that recognizes the futility of reforming the Federal Government through elections would also recognize the uselessness of most academic institutions, think tanks, and any political movement that is trying to effect change through voting.
Thursday, September 09, 2010
A question about the Church and Universal Suffrage
Has the Church ever endorsed universal suffrage?
The Church does not endorse any particular form of government (in particular, the forms of government enumerated by the ancients and considered by the medievals -- monarchy, aristocracy, or polity). It only requires that government serve the common good (rather than the private good of those who are ruling).
A quick search reminded me of this post at Ite ad Thomam. Talking about who is qualified to participate in ruling and who is not is implicitly tied to claims about distributive justice. I don't see the Magisterium coming out with a statement supporting [absolute] universal suffrage (which ignores the question of whether one is morally qualified to rule or not) when this would be contrary to distributive justice. (Individual bishops and priests may do so, but I would claim that they do not have adequate support from Tradition or reason. Praise of liberal democracy exists, even at the highest levels, but it is, as far as I remember, limited and conditional.)
Still, even if the Church hasn't endorsed universal suffrage, it may maintain that in communities where it exists, Catholic citizens have a duty to exercise citizenship (to participate in elections and so on). Power should be used if it is given to one, even if he does not deserve it, for not using would be failing to prevent others from misusing it? However, what if he cannot exercise it well? What if Catholic citizens perceive that they are not qualified to vote, because they are not well informed of the issues or candidates? Not only can they opt out of voting, but would it be morally necessary for them to do so?
What of the apparent paradox that the knowledge that one is not qualified is founded upon the knowledge of what is necessary to be qualified, and those who have this fundamental knowledge are thereby qualified? We would have to break this down and look at what is actually known and to see if it is the same in all three cases. In the first, one may have opinion or moral science of who should be a citizen, but the most important qualification of a citizen is his virtue: the moral virtues including prudence or practical wisdom, which are not identical with opinion and moral science.
Something related:
Here is an article in the NY Times from the last century, in which a Catholic priest defends giving women the right to vote.
The Church does not endorse any particular form of government (in particular, the forms of government enumerated by the ancients and considered by the medievals -- monarchy, aristocracy, or polity). It only requires that government serve the common good (rather than the private good of those who are ruling).
A quick search reminded me of this post at Ite ad Thomam. Talking about who is qualified to participate in ruling and who is not is implicitly tied to claims about distributive justice. I don't see the Magisterium coming out with a statement supporting [absolute] universal suffrage (which ignores the question of whether one is morally qualified to rule or not) when this would be contrary to distributive justice. (Individual bishops and priests may do so, but I would claim that they do not have adequate support from Tradition or reason. Praise of liberal democracy exists, even at the highest levels, but it is, as far as I remember, limited and conditional.)
Still, even if the Church hasn't endorsed universal suffrage, it may maintain that in communities where it exists, Catholic citizens have a duty to exercise citizenship (to participate in elections and so on). Power should be used if it is given to one, even if he does not deserve it, for not using would be failing to prevent others from misusing it? However, what if he cannot exercise it well? What if Catholic citizens perceive that they are not qualified to vote, because they are not well informed of the issues or candidates? Not only can they opt out of voting, but would it be morally necessary for them to do so?
What of the apparent paradox that the knowledge that one is not qualified is founded upon the knowledge of what is necessary to be qualified, and those who have this fundamental knowledge are thereby qualified? We would have to break this down and look at what is actually known and to see if it is the same in all three cases. In the first, one may have opinion or moral science of who should be a citizen, but the most important qualification of a citizen is his virtue: the moral virtues including prudence or practical wisdom, which are not identical with opinion and moral science.
Something related:
Here is an article in the NY Times from the last century, in which a Catholic priest defends giving women the right to vote.
Labels:
distributive justice,
moral theology,
politike,
voting
Friday, July 02, 2010
Adam Webb on voting
Knowing One’s Place at the Ballot Box
The prevailing model of local voting has deep defects, which often work against strong communities. The modern standard is one person, one vote, one place. While this standard is simple, it leads to outcomes that run against common sense.
Sunday, June 13, 2010
Voting
On Thursday's Open Q&A on Catholic Answers Live (rm, mp3), a question was raised about voting and Colin B. Donovan supported the position that it was better to cast one's vote for the "lesser of two evils" than for the "good man" who has no chance of being elected. Rather than give a summary, I will instead transcribe what was said:
[Caller (Casey)]: "The question I have is kinda theoretical, but it has some practical applications. It's something a buddy of mine and I have been arguing about a couple of years now... it's an argument about the obligation a Catholic has while voting."
[Mr. Donovan] Right.
[Casey] For instance he is set up with these three possible candidates. I mean, go back to 2008, where you had Obama, who is violently anti-life; you got McCain, who is kinda wishy-washy. But then you did have an option where they were staunchly pro-life. The question is, are you obligated to vote for someone who has the right views, but doesn't really have a good chance of getting elected... I mean' it's not a practical vote.
[Mr. Donovan] Yeah, it's much clearer when you have two people. There's a long moral theology tradition that you can find that you can find in any collections of moral theologians over the decades, centuries even, that you can chose or you ought to choose the lesser of two evils. Whatever will serve the common good.
[Casey] Right, kinda like the principle of double effect idea.
[Mr. Donovan] Essentially, I mean, what you are are doing is you are choosing them for the good effect that you are at minimum preventing a worse candidate from getting in there, even though you are not embracing some of their positions, and you are only tolerating them. This has been wrongly, very wrongly, interpreted as you can vote for a pro-abortion candidate if the alternative is somebody who has some other things that are contrary to Catholic teaching. And that's the whole debate of course between the whole Bush-Gore, Bush-Obama debate was, well. If you think the war is unjust, do you have a right to say, well I want to vote for Obama, or for Gore or whoever it is, because they are not pro-war, even though they are pro-abortion. When you stack up the positions, what is intrinsically evil versus what is a political judgment, there really was no debate, reasonably, although some attempted to say that there was. So when you have two candidates it's pretty, I think you usually have a clear choice, if you look at the critical issues of those who support intrinsic evils, such as stem-cell research, abortion, and homosexual marriage and so on, versus those who may on prudential judgments you disagree with them. And that's often the case.
Now when you have three, I think most theologians and the bishops even who have spoken on it, are prepared to give some latitude to people to say that, sure you do not want to be responsible for bad candidate #1 getting in because you vote for good candidate #3. Now you can certainly, very easily see the argument, well if I vote for the straight-line pro-life candidate, then the worse of the two other candidates will get in. And do you want to be morally responsible for that? I think that has got to weigh on the consciences of people. But most theologians and the bishops who I have mentioned do, at least I think, understand that for some people they simply cannot swallow hard enough to vote for either 1 or 2, and they want to vote for the third.
So I don't think there is any, I think that they, a voter, a Catholic voter should seriously think of abandoning an electable candidate, weaknesses he may have, in favor of the lily-pure candidate, such as they think he is, or she, even though that candidate has no chance being elected. Because after all, politics is a practical thing. It's not meant to, we're not going to set up paradise on earth after all.
[Casey] Utopia doesn't exist.
[Mr. Donovan] Yes, you're not gonna have have Utopia. The one bad thing Thomas More wrote, probably, was about utopia.
(This begins at about the 23:25 mark in the program.)
By the way, St. Thomas More actually is the patron saint of statesmen and politicans.
So it would appear that Mr. Donovan endorse the position that one should vote for the lesser of two evils, in order to prevent the worse candidate from winning. It is almost like a form of consequentialism that attributes to the external act no moral status. It is not clear to me whether Mr. Donovan actually has an opinion about whether the act of voting is instrinsically moral or not. But since it deals with others or the community, it pertains either to particular justice or general justice, or both. Which is it? I doubt that moral theologians have talked about voting for more than several centuries, since mass democracy is relatively recent. As for the bishops... I'd have to see an actual statement or two in order to know what they are actually saying with respect to voting.
At least he did not use the saying "Politics as the art of the possible," to justify this position. The saying is usually understood as being applicable to legislators, or to the different branches/officers of government, who must compromise with one another, not to voters, who participate in politics only in so far as they choose those who are to serve in office, but no more.
People generally select candidates based solely on issues and what they promise to do in office (along with experience and reputation), rather than actual knowledge of their character. Is this the same as thinking that government should reflect the will of the people? Do people see voting as a delegation of authority, rather than selecting (or endorsing) someone who is qualified to rule?
Regarding the comment about consciences: Who is responsible for bad legislation? Those who have the power to enact legislation, the legislators. Not the voters. Who is responsible for getting bad people into office? Not those who refrain from voting (because their vote won't make a difference), or vote for a third-party candidate instead of the candidate from the other part of the duopoly. Rather, only those who vote for those bad candidates are responsible. (Mr. Donovan is not taking this position, that voters who "enable" bad candidates to take office because they do not vote for the competitor who is not so bad are somehow morally culpable of putting them in office, but a committed consequentialist would make this argument.)
Aristotle discusses who is qualified to rule in his Politics. I believe that he claims that the
is a question of justice. Although he does not explicitly say it belongs to that justice involved with distributions, I believe that distributive justice is involved because the good involved is common, namely that of rulilng the community, and this is to be apportioned to one, a few, or many. Who should rule, according to Aristotle? The virtuous -- only they have a just claim to hold office.
If this is the case, then isn't one bound in distributive justice to vote only for those who are qualified for office? To give office to someone who is not qualified (lacks virtue) is counter to distributive justice and facilitates a bad regime coming into existence. If it is intrinsically unjust to vote for someone who is not qualified for office, even if he is not as bad as another candidate, then even if we can bring about a "better" outcome by electing him, it is still wrong. ("The ends do not justify the means.") Aristotle's virtue is not just right belief (or having the right platform), or even the science of politics -- it is complete set of virtues, all of which are interconnected through reason.
If someone endorses the wrong positions, or defends the wrong ends, does that give us enough of an indication as to what his personal character is like? We would be mistaken to think that someone who is "sincere" in his beliefs cannot be vicious. But how do we evaluate a politician who rejects traditional morality as being binding on all and foundational to society, but does not appear to personally act against it?
If we are unable to become acquainted enough with a candidate to know his character because of the size of our polity, should we be voting for him? Rather, we should see if there is an intrinsic problem with the political economy because of its size. If the only candidates who can possibly win are those who lack virtue, or are merely the tools of the rich and powerful, then let us not pretend that we live in a polity or a republic -- we are living in an oligarchy, and our votes do not matter much to begin with.
(Would Aristotle explain that it is beneficial for the many in a polity to be able to select those who hold office because in this case the judgment of the many is better than the judgment of a few?)
If all we have is a knowledge of where a person stands on various issues, perhaps that might suffice, given the current circumstances, to warrant a vote. But it is definitely not ideal.
Participating in electoral politics in a bad regime will probably not change the bad regime, because all regimes seek their own preservation, and thus the system is set up accordingly . (Which is not to say that the virtuous man should disobey them.) If there is to be positive change, it must be accomplished through other means.
Notes:
As voters, is our concern with backing someone who is most likely to bring about the common good? Or do we need to focus on determining who is virtuous? What is the nature of our obligation to promote the common good relative to participating in elections?
Instead of expecting a definite plan of action, should we be satisfied that a candidate knows what goods to secure for the community? Should we trust the virtuous man to compromise in the right way, rather than the unknown man who promises to bring about the legislative changes you want?
A reminder that an atomistic community is no community at all:
[Caller (Casey)]: "The question I have is kinda theoretical, but it has some practical applications. It's something a buddy of mine and I have been arguing about a couple of years now... it's an argument about the obligation a Catholic has while voting."
[Mr. Donovan] Right.
[Casey] For instance he is set up with these three possible candidates. I mean, go back to 2008, where you had Obama, who is violently anti-life; you got McCain, who is kinda wishy-washy. But then you did have an option where they were staunchly pro-life. The question is, are you obligated to vote for someone who has the right views, but doesn't really have a good chance of getting elected... I mean' it's not a practical vote.
[Mr. Donovan] Yeah, it's much clearer when you have two people. There's a long moral theology tradition that you can find that you can find in any collections of moral theologians over the decades, centuries even, that you can chose or you ought to choose the lesser of two evils. Whatever will serve the common good.
[Casey] Right, kinda like the principle of double effect idea.
[Mr. Donovan] Essentially, I mean, what you are are doing is you are choosing them for the good effect that you are at minimum preventing a worse candidate from getting in there, even though you are not embracing some of their positions, and you are only tolerating them. This has been wrongly, very wrongly, interpreted as you can vote for a pro-abortion candidate if the alternative is somebody who has some other things that are contrary to Catholic teaching. And that's the whole debate of course between the whole Bush-Gore, Bush-Obama debate was, well. If you think the war is unjust, do you have a right to say, well I want to vote for Obama, or for Gore or whoever it is, because they are not pro-war, even though they are pro-abortion. When you stack up the positions, what is intrinsically evil versus what is a political judgment, there really was no debate, reasonably, although some attempted to say that there was. So when you have two candidates it's pretty, I think you usually have a clear choice, if you look at the critical issues of those who support intrinsic evils, such as stem-cell research, abortion, and homosexual marriage and so on, versus those who may on prudential judgments you disagree with them. And that's often the case.
Now when you have three, I think most theologians and the bishops even who have spoken on it, are prepared to give some latitude to people to say that, sure you do not want to be responsible for bad candidate #1 getting in because you vote for good candidate #3. Now you can certainly, very easily see the argument, well if I vote for the straight-line pro-life candidate, then the worse of the two other candidates will get in. And do you want to be morally responsible for that? I think that has got to weigh on the consciences of people. But most theologians and the bishops who I have mentioned do, at least I think, understand that for some people they simply cannot swallow hard enough to vote for either 1 or 2, and they want to vote for the third.
So I don't think there is any, I think that they, a voter, a Catholic voter should seriously think of abandoning an electable candidate, weaknesses he may have, in favor of the lily-pure candidate, such as they think he is, or she, even though that candidate has no chance being elected. Because after all, politics is a practical thing. It's not meant to, we're not going to set up paradise on earth after all.
[Casey] Utopia doesn't exist.
[Mr. Donovan] Yes, you're not gonna have have Utopia. The one bad thing Thomas More wrote, probably, was about utopia.
(This begins at about the 23:25 mark in the program.)
By the way, St. Thomas More actually is the patron saint of statesmen and politicans.
So it would appear that Mr. Donovan endorse the position that one should vote for the lesser of two evils, in order to prevent the worse candidate from winning. It is almost like a form of consequentialism that attributes to the external act no moral status. It is not clear to me whether Mr. Donovan actually has an opinion about whether the act of voting is instrinsically moral or not. But since it deals with others or the community, it pertains either to particular justice or general justice, or both. Which is it? I doubt that moral theologians have talked about voting for more than several centuries, since mass democracy is relatively recent. As for the bishops... I'd have to see an actual statement or two in order to know what they are actually saying with respect to voting.
At least he did not use the saying "Politics as the art of the possible," to justify this position. The saying is usually understood as being applicable to legislators, or to the different branches/officers of government, who must compromise with one another, not to voters, who participate in politics only in so far as they choose those who are to serve in office, but no more.
People generally select candidates based solely on issues and what they promise to do in office (along with experience and reputation), rather than actual knowledge of their character. Is this the same as thinking that government should reflect the will of the people? Do people see voting as a delegation of authority, rather than selecting (or endorsing) someone who is qualified to rule?
Regarding the comment about consciences: Who is responsible for bad legislation? Those who have the power to enact legislation, the legislators. Not the voters. Who is responsible for getting bad people into office? Not those who refrain from voting (because their vote won't make a difference), or vote for a third-party candidate instead of the candidate from the other part of the duopoly. Rather, only those who vote for those bad candidates are responsible. (Mr. Donovan is not taking this position, that voters who "enable" bad candidates to take office because they do not vote for the competitor who is not so bad are somehow morally culpable of putting them in office, but a committed consequentialist would make this argument.)
Aristotle discusses who is qualified to rule in his Politics. I believe that he claims that the
is a question of justice. Although he does not explicitly say it belongs to that justice involved with distributions, I believe that distributive justice is involved because the good involved is common, namely that of rulilng the community, and this is to be apportioned to one, a few, or many. Who should rule, according to Aristotle? The virtuous -- only they have a just claim to hold office.
If this is the case, then isn't one bound in distributive justice to vote only for those who are qualified for office? To give office to someone who is not qualified (lacks virtue) is counter to distributive justice and facilitates a bad regime coming into existence. If it is intrinsically unjust to vote for someone who is not qualified for office, even if he is not as bad as another candidate, then even if we can bring about a "better" outcome by electing him, it is still wrong. ("The ends do not justify the means.") Aristotle's virtue is not just right belief (or having the right platform), or even the science of politics -- it is complete set of virtues, all of which are interconnected through reason.
If someone endorses the wrong positions, or defends the wrong ends, does that give us enough of an indication as to what his personal character is like? We would be mistaken to think that someone who is "sincere" in his beliefs cannot be vicious. But how do we evaluate a politician who rejects traditional morality as being binding on all and foundational to society, but does not appear to personally act against it?
If we are unable to become acquainted enough with a candidate to know his character because of the size of our polity, should we be voting for him? Rather, we should see if there is an intrinsic problem with the political economy because of its size. If the only candidates who can possibly win are those who lack virtue, or are merely the tools of the rich and powerful, then let us not pretend that we live in a polity or a republic -- we are living in an oligarchy, and our votes do not matter much to begin with.
(Would Aristotle explain that it is beneficial for the many in a polity to be able to select those who hold office because in this case the judgment of the many is better than the judgment of a few?)
If all we have is a knowledge of where a person stands on various issues, perhaps that might suffice, given the current circumstances, to warrant a vote. But it is definitely not ideal.
Participating in electoral politics in a bad regime will probably not change the bad regime, because all regimes seek their own preservation, and thus the system is set up accordingly . (Which is not to say that the virtuous man should disobey them.) If there is to be positive change, it must be accomplished through other means.
Notes:
As voters, is our concern with backing someone who is most likely to bring about the common good? Or do we need to focus on determining who is virtuous? What is the nature of our obligation to promote the common good relative to participating in elections?
Instead of expecting a definite plan of action, should we be satisfied that a candidate knows what goods to secure for the community? Should we trust the virtuous man to compromise in the right way, rather than the unknown man who promises to bring about the legislative changes you want?
A reminder that an atomistic community is no community at all:
This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and Megara, to be brought together so that their walls touched, still they would not be one city, not even if the citizens had the right to intermarry, which is one of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if men dwelt at a distance from one another, but not so far off as to have no intercourse, and there were laws among them that they should not wrong each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have nothing in common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not constitute a state. Why is this? Surely not because they are at a distance from one another: for even supposing that such a community were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as before their union. It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life. (Politics, III.3)
Labels:
Aristotle,
distributive justice,
politike,
voting
Thursday, September 18, 2008
What does voting mean?
Or, upon what basis do we choose someone for political office?
Mr. Jeff Culbreath, explains his preference for the American Independent Party over the Constitution Party:
I agree with him on this point:
(Is the CP more "pure" in its embrace of conservative principles at least, even if its history is a bit faulty?)
In contrast, saying that one state in the union or another has a Christian foundation--that seems ok, as some of the colonies were settled by believers, and some even had official state churches.
It got me thinking about the debates leading up to nominating convention (for certain Federal offices?). Historically, was the platform decided at the convention? How much variation was there for different offices? How were candidates selected in the past? Did the party vet its own members? Is it possible to practice this more "personal" kind of politics when the territory is too large, and the people are not familiar with one another?
How do debates between the candidates match up with the will of the people on various issues? Should there not be agreement on the general principles of the party; what should be prohibited (abortion, for the Church, is non-negotiable, unlike, perhaps prostitution)?
Some questions may be settled only by prudence and cannot be addressed properly in the abstract. So then beyond general principles, should we not be looking for people who respect law and authority and embody justice to hold office? Personality and character do matter. The platform is meaningless if the candidate is lying and will not implement it. And hence the need, first of all, for honesty and trustworthiness in our candidates, and the possession of the moral virtues.
As for the third party candidates: Baldwin or Barr (or even Nader) -- I know nothing about their personal qualities. Are they nonetheless "safe bets"? Voting for a third-party candidate is a concession to the circumstances, if it isn't misplaced trust. I will admit that this is not the best way to proceed with respect to civic life, but if one cannot vote for any of the candidates because one does not have sufficient knowledge of who they are, then one cannot vote. Even if they all turn out to be bad, then is it possible that the one who is the most correct regarding general principles and policies/solutions is the least evil? And one should prevent someone who is worse in this regard from taking office, to prevent greater evils from taking place?
(For example, some have claimed that McCain is better than Obama, if we consider mainly the sort of people they would nominate to the U.S. Supreme Court.)
But the fact that someone mouths the correct principles does not mean that he is the most "virtuous" or qualified to rule.
Americans need to practice being neighbors first (and running a household), before attempting to shape the community by engaging in politics?
What would the anti-Federalists say and do?
Yesterday was Constitution Day (recognized by the Constitution Party). Someone at Facebook, and a contributor to CHT, asked us to remember the Articles of Confederation.
Constitution Center--Constitution Day
What happened to the Reform Party?
Mr. Jeff Culbreath, explains his preference for the American Independent Party over the Constitution Party:
My objection to the CP platform is that it says too much about too many things. It’s a political straightjacket and the CP will forever remain a tiny party for that reason. I can’t imagine CP primary debates, for example, because if the candidates sign off on the platform there is nothing left to debate.In contrast,
The AIP platform is brief and to the point, leaving room, as it explicitly says, “for debate over prudential policy matters within certain parameters of fundamental American political thought and a framework of ordered liberty.”
I agree with him on this point:
And the preface is creepy. This country was not “founded on the Gospel of Jesus Christ” in point of fact. The language of a Republic “rooted in biblical law” reeks of Rushdooneyism. (from the Preamble to the National Platform)Not that it is creepy, but it seems to be historically untrue. Without accepting the criticism offered by some Catholics that the United States is a project of the Enlightenment (or the propaganda offered by some nationalists that we should be looking to the Declaration of Independence and its proclamation of rights of divine origin as the foundation of the 'proposition nation'), I think that if we are talking about the federation established by the Constitution (or the Articles of Confederation, for that matter), then we should be looking more to the Anglo-American political tradition for the primary inspiration, rather than to Christianity.
(Is the CP more "pure" in its embrace of conservative principles at least, even if its history is a bit faulty?)
In contrast, saying that one state in the union or another has a Christian foundation--that seems ok, as some of the colonies were settled by believers, and some even had official state churches.
It got me thinking about the debates leading up to nominating convention (for certain Federal offices?). Historically, was the platform decided at the convention? How much variation was there for different offices? How were candidates selected in the past? Did the party vet its own members? Is it possible to practice this more "personal" kind of politics when the territory is too large, and the people are not familiar with one another?
How do debates between the candidates match up with the will of the people on various issues? Should there not be agreement on the general principles of the party; what should be prohibited (abortion, for the Church, is non-negotiable, unlike, perhaps prostitution)?
Some questions may be settled only by prudence and cannot be addressed properly in the abstract. So then beyond general principles, should we not be looking for people who respect law and authority and embody justice to hold office? Personality and character do matter. The platform is meaningless if the candidate is lying and will not implement it. And hence the need, first of all, for honesty and trustworthiness in our candidates, and the possession of the moral virtues.
As for the third party candidates: Baldwin or Barr (or even Nader) -- I know nothing about their personal qualities. Are they nonetheless "safe bets"? Voting for a third-party candidate is a concession to the circumstances, if it isn't misplaced trust. I will admit that this is not the best way to proceed with respect to civic life, but if one cannot vote for any of the candidates because one does not have sufficient knowledge of who they are, then one cannot vote. Even if they all turn out to be bad, then is it possible that the one who is the most correct regarding general principles and policies/solutions is the least evil? And one should prevent someone who is worse in this regard from taking office, to prevent greater evils from taking place?
(For example, some have claimed that McCain is better than Obama, if we consider mainly the sort of people they would nominate to the U.S. Supreme Court.)
But the fact that someone mouths the correct principles does not mean that he is the most "virtuous" or qualified to rule.
Americans need to practice being neighbors first (and running a household), before attempting to shape the community by engaging in politics?
What would the anti-Federalists say and do?
Yesterday was Constitution Day (recognized by the Constitution Party). Someone at Facebook, and a contributor to CHT, asked us to remember the Articles of Confederation.
Constitution Center--Constitution Day
What happened to the Reform Party?
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