Showing posts with label justice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label justice. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 19, 2022

CLTs

Monday, March 22, 2021

"Give Us a King"

Saturday, February 20, 2021

Manceaux Dueling Pistols

Tuesday, February 02, 2021

The Political System is a Farce

Tuesday, January 05, 2021

But What Means to Obtain the Desired End Results of "Justice" and "Equity"?

Wednesday, December 30, 2020

A Matter of Justice Difficult to Resolve Thanks to Oligarchy and Statism





Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Restorative Justice

I am not opposed to what it implies (rehabilitation/rehabilitation/re-education) though the name itself is misleading. But restorative justice cannot be exercised in a state that is by its very nature dysfunctional and opposed to true human formation. "Restorative justice" is possible only at a small scale, in true communities.

Friday, November 27, 2020

The Need for... Distributism





Edit.

Wednesday, November 25, 2020

Charles Hugh Smith and Gordon Long on Unfairness



Thursday, November 12, 2020

But the Land is for the People, a Community

Not for atomized individuals to claim based on the rights defined by liberal justice

Monday, November 09, 2020

Federal Land Policy

Saturday, October 24, 2020

"Traditional Christian Teaching"

I doubt it.



Have prisoners grow their own food and pay back the taxpayer for the initial investment into farming supplies and materials. This should be feasible in minimum-security facilities, even if there are concerns about them stealing tools to make weapons. Or theys hould be doing some sort of labor to repay the taxpayer.

Wednesday, September 23, 2020

Carl F. Horowitz on Reparations



It was taken down? Not sure what's going on.



Edit. Here it is:

Tuesday, August 11, 2020

Nozick on Reparations



Grant Havers for Law & Liberty

Thursday, August 06, 2020

Interpreting the Constitution



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BR22GpGEjf4

Jordan L. Perkins:
In some of my earlier academic writings, I attempted to lay out how this three-stage translation strikes me as in need of a great deal of explication, as there is an especially huge conceptual gap in how (2) becomes (3). But that is not my present point. My present point is that (2) itself seems to be a radically incomplete understanding of what ‘this Constitution’ means, even before we attempt to get to (3). This is because the words which were subject to negotiation in the 1787 Philadelphia Convention and then debate on the merits during the ratification process were interpreted in light of a specific intellectual tradition, that of the Anglo-American common law and constitution. ‘This Constitution’ makes sense only in light of that tradition, as interpreted by not only the Framers themselves (narrowly understood), but everyone directly involved in the ratification process. Constitutional texts are, as I would put it, enveloped within a shroud of implicature—they mean not only what they actually say, but also what they can be fairly understood to mean within the context of the social, economic, political, and legal tradition of the community to which they are addressed.

This is to say that ‘this Constitution’ cannot be merely the words on the page and/or what is specifically denoted by them. It must be something broader than this. The question is how far we must expand our net to capture the entirety of a plausible answer and if originalism, as a legal positivistic doctrine, can fully contain the answer which emerges. Again, I think not.

The strongest form of originalism for this debate, I think, is the original public meaning originalism which is largely dominant amongst contemporary adherents of the originalist doctrine. It holds that the Constitution (or any equivalent text) means, objectively, for all time, what it would have been understood to have meant by the community of speakers to which it was addressed. In other words, the Constitution means, basically, what the people who were engaged in the ratification debates thought it meant at the time.

Now, under this understanding of originalism, there’s a way of thinking that a legal positivistic doctrine might encompass the entire shroud of implicature (as I just put it) which imbues the constitutional text with its meaning. This is presumably because there is a fact of the matter as to what the political, legal, moral, and social conventions which provided the interpretive context in which the Constitution was initially understood, and these facts can presumably be unearthed, ideally through the law-office history which serves as the originalist jurisprudence's primary research tool.

and

Two things should here be noted. One is that we’ve drastically expanded the realm of meaning for ‘this Constitution’ to something which can be recovered, for the most part, through a within-the-four-corners interpretation of the text to one which requires a Quentin Skinner-esque full contextualization of the constitutional text within its complete intellectual habitat. To read the Constitution in this way properly would require fully getting inside the heads of those who wrote—reading what they read, understanding as they understood, thinking what they thought. As a conceptual matter, we might have identified a way originalism could meet the Vermeulean challenge. As a practical matter, it would be almost insane for anyone not experienced as a Cambridge School historian to try.

Or maybe a people would need a tradition with which they understood and interpreted the Constitution, and passed this tradition on to their descendants so that it would be understood and interpreted properly by them as well.
But if too many people are required to spread the tradition properly, is there any reasonable guarantee that the tradition will be kept?

If the meaning of a text could be lost so easily (and indeed even within the first generation appeals to the text alone could not suffice to prevent abuses), then maybe 1. many more things should have been explicitly written out by the ratifying conventions as addenda or the like, to be approved by all, or 2. the project of having a written constitution for a federal system should have been reconsidered. But those who ratified the Constitution were also hung up on their assumption that states were normative polities, so we should not expect them to have that much wisdom.

If the tradition no longer exists by which one can properly interpret the document, or there is no longer a shared consensus on its meaning, then is it still valid and binding as an agreement? If one cannot come to an agreement, is the compact automatically void, or does not still need to go through the motion of repealing it and replacing it with a different legal state of affairs?

Thursday, July 09, 2020

Corporations



Edit.
See also:

Saturday, May 23, 2020

Freedom of Association

Freedom of association is important, but this essay strikes me as a typical libertarian/liberal exposition of that freedom. We can agree that there is a freedom of association, or a right of association, which cannot be infringed upon by some [higher] political authority.

Public Discourse: Reviving the Freedom of Association by Nathanael Blake

Blake builds upon this book from Kansas University Press: Why Associations Matter: The Case for First Amendment Pluralism by Luke C. Sheahan.

Monday, May 18, 2020

Dreher Talks about His Forthcoming Book

And he talks about the QAnon stuff in a Dreherian way... Going to skip over that.



QAnon & Living By Lies:
As you regular readers know, this book is about the creeping “soft totalitarianism” in our society, and what Christian dissidents who lived under Soviet bloc communism can tell us about how to recognize it and resist it. In its most simple definition, “totalitarianism” is a word used to describe a state in which all things are politicized. The key difference between authoritarianism and totalitarianism is in the first, the state only seeks a monopoly on political action, whereas in the latter, the state wants to command all aspects of life, and — this is key — to compel not only obedience, but internal assent. As Winston Smith was told, you must learn to love Big Brother.

The word was invented in fascist Italy, but has been applied both to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and its vassals. One consistent story that we have heard from anti-communist dissidents is that the entire system was built on lies — that is, on the willingness of people to assent to lies. Vaclav Havel (who was not a Christian) said that the only resistance available to people under communism, where it was impossible to build political opposition, was to seek to “live in truth” — that is, to refuse to participate in lies. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was even more emphatic on this point. The title of my book is taken from his final message to the Soviet people in 1974, on the eve of his expulsion from the country. That essay, “Live Not By Lies,” urged readers to engage in passive resistance to the regime of lies: that is, to refuse to say, or to appear to say, something that they believe is untrue, just to keep the peace.
How far does resistance go? In this respect perhaps Herbert McCabe was more daring -- I will get that post published soon.

Thursday, May 14, 2020

Virtue Politics

HUP: Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy by James Hankins





The Complicated Politics of Virtue by Mark Blitz

Mark Blitz is probably a Straussian. Still, it doesn't seem like the book is that helpful and one should probably read the primary sources themselves instead. As for a book detailing the influence these Renaissance thinkers had on actual statesmen... what book covers that?

Tuesday, May 12, 2020

Liberal Republicanism

A subversion of a good regime with bad assumptions about society. Yankee personal background? Or just his intellectual background?

Republican Liberty and the Failure of Substantive Due Process by James R. Rogers
Republican liberty means that people are not subjected to the arbitrary will of another, which is slavery. Hence, the repeated identification by the American colonists of the abuses of British rule with an intent to reduce Americans to the status of slaves. The argument wasn’t that Americans asserted the British designed to make chattel slaves of Americans. Rather, the Americans argued that if the principle be granted allowing for arbitrary governance, then they had conceded the critical principle distinguishing freemen from slaves, and there was no logical stopping point between their state and the state of abject slavery.
If citizens are subjected to the will of some who are not accountable to them, how is that republicanism? This is a very poor definition of liberty, if that is all there is to it. Liberty means not being ruled by another, first of all by a foreign power, and second, by a domestic power which has no just claim to authority. As for the will being the principle under consideration, rather than order or reason, I don't know if the author is being sloppy or deliberate in espousing some form of voluntarism. Slaves are subject to the rule of another, it may be just or it may be unjust, and whether it is to be judged arbitrary or not depends on whether the good of the one ruled is considered or not. (I am not going to explain here how the good of the slave is to be taken into account and what protections slaves should have from their masters, except to say that there are standards of justice prohibiting masters from harming their slaves unjustly.)