Showing posts with label virtue. Show all posts
Showing posts with label virtue. Show all posts

Saturday, October 31, 2020

One Take on Capitalism

Tuesday, August 11, 2020

A Man's Word

"I made a promise, and I'd rather lose it [the ranch and the land] than break it. And he'd rather me lose it too."John Dutton, Yellowstone, S03E08

I don't know what surprises the season finale may have, but we will see how many of the season's story arcs are wrapped up neatly.



Updated:

Wednesday, July 15, 2020

Moral Imagination and Paideia



L&L review by Joshua Bowman of The Historical Mind: Humanistic Renewal in a Post-Constitutional Age

In this way, the book exemplifies a tradition of “moral realism” and resistance to abstract moral idealism. This realism requires, as one might expect, a sufficient attunement to reality in the broadest sense. That attunement takes place in the interplay between will, reason, and especially “imagination,” a word emphasized by nearly every author in the book.

“Imagination” as understood by Ryn and Babbitt, drawing on Burke, Benedetto Croce, S.T. Coleridge and others, is a pre-rational intuition of the good, the true, and the beautiful. “The imagination,” the editors explain, “always gives a unity, but it does not always give one that is real, which is to say, it is not always commensurate with the concrete, historical experience of human life.” Put simply, then, an imagination rooted in reality is what Ryn and Babbitt see as the Burkean “moral imagination,” while an imagination disconnected from reality is termed the “Romantic” or “idyllic” imagination of Rousseau.


By focusing on the imagination, the contributors emphasize the centrality of ethical character and culture which can be nourished or corrupted by experience and works of philosophy, history, theology, literature, art, and film.

The same as Kirk's use of the term "moral imagination"? It would seem so, as he, too, draws from Burke. It may be time to revisit this, the sharpening of synderesis through paideia, and what role art has to play in paideia. Imagination should be subject to right reason, not perverse appetite, I think we can agree with these traditional conservatives on that. But does the shaping of the "moral imagination" through the human letters, as offered by traditional conservatives, differ from the Renaissance humanists and contemporary intellectuals who are trying to resurrect them? There must already be something to a rightly-formed character in the youth for there to be a moral imagination which can receive something from the human letters. But paideia is not limited to humane studies alone, as Kirk admitted: "Of course it was not by books alone that the normative understanding of the framers of the Constitution, for instance, was formed. Their apprehension of norms was acquired also in family, church, and school, and in the business of ordinary life." The question is whether we have these other sources of moral formation now. I would say that many of them no longer exist or have been vitiated by both the presence of moral error and also by people who have fallen from the standards of Christian morality.

Also, let us not forget that the sort of paideia and handing on of tradition necessary to maintain American republicanism and to preserve the federal order given by the Constitution was already failing in the first half of the 19th cent, not the 20th, as is revealed by Lincoln's successful initiation and pursuit of the Late Unpleasantness. Second, the reviewer admits: "A country as large as the United States could hardly expect to achieve a kind of Aristotelian politeia" but "a genuine, widespread constitutional ethos is possible." It is probably an unreasonable fantasy that a "Constitutional imagination that informs morality" can be possibly restored at a national level. But we can work for the restoration of a good and healthy paideia, republicanism, and Aristotelian politeia at the local level.

Thursday, May 14, 2020

Virtue Politics

HUP: Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy by James Hankins





The Complicated Politics of Virtue by Mark Blitz

Mark Blitz is probably a Straussian. Still, it doesn't seem like the book is that helpful and one should probably read the primary sources themselves instead. As for a book detailing the influence these Renaissance thinkers had on actual statesmen... what book covers that?

Friday, April 17, 2020

Habits Are Culture-Specific

Peoples of different cultures do raise children with certain patterns of behavior that differ from other peoples. And the education may differ not only with the virtues that are produced but also with respect to how it is handled. But this does not justify some sort of moral relativistic claim that these habits are "equal" -- the habits may serve the good of the individuals, or the people, or the state, but that doesn't entail that the ends they satisfy are fulfilled in a proper (or reasonable) way, or that the ends they satisfy are necessarily the right ones. Only now is our generation understanding what happens to children when the father has very little involvement with paideia.

Saturday, April 20, 2019

"I Feel"

As men have become subjugated to a female-centered social order, they have adopted female speech patterns and diction, with one example being the replacement of "I think" with "I feel." This is true even in academic discourse or discussion, though with the increasing number of women displacing men, I should say "especially true." This underscores the old stereotype of women being emotional, but it needs to be explicated through modern psychology -- RT talks about female behavior, Instinct-Emotion-Reason.

With respect to speculative matters, judgement of particulars is perhaps not so influenced by emotion, but there could be associations that nonetheless have an effect on judgment. But with respect to practical matters? Emotion can easily prevent right judgment from being developed. Perceiving or judging whether someone is a good or evil? Easily affected by emotion, and if one by nature perceives the world through emotion first, then it is necessary to have some sort of external check on this.

Similarly, with respect to general statements, a woman can take a negative general statement (such as generalizations about female [behavioral] psychology) and think that it applies to her as well, or that it is an implicit criticism of her. (NAWALT) And there is also the phenomenon of female outrage, which may be driven by a separate need but is nonetheless linked to this. Third, there is the need to protect one's self-image from anything that might affect it. We hear about low self-esteem among women, but is that really due to social pressure? Or is it linked to a desire for some good, and perceiving defects in herself that would impede her from attaining that good?

Does emotion contribute to practical reason? Of course it does. But is it the sole determinant? No. Perception of moral reality is dependent upon virtue to govern the emotions. But male virtue is different from female virtue because male psychology is different from female psychology. Hence the talk of developing a female-centered ethics by women is pointless, because most women need an external check on their emotion and to order it properly.

Always Get It in Writing

Sunday, February 24, 2019

Take a Punch in the Face

Something Vox has said several times in recent months is that everyone should experience being punched in the face -- it gives them a dose of humility and also teaches something about themselves and their reaction to violence.

Bossiness among girls and women -- assertiveness, or being able to boss people around, is not leadership. How many woman would be willing to take punch to the face in order to be trained for leadership? And to receive a punch in order to protect their role or to be accountable if they are given leadership?

Wednesday, February 06, 2019

A Call to Aristotelianism

Resilience: Why Liberals Should be Conservative: Climate Change, Excellence, and the Practice of Happiness, Part 2 by Erik Lindberg
The Resurgent Aristotelians: Hopkins, Fleming, Francis, and Holmgren

Tuesday, January 08, 2019

Wednesday, December 20, 2017

Saturday, October 07, 2017

What does charity require?

I have no reason that even for Christians the liberal assumption that all people are equally rational is true, or that all Christians are capable of dialectic, as opposed to being accustomed to rhetoric. Are we required by charity to maintain the pretense that Christians are? Or should we instead relate to them according to how they actually are?

Charity is not opposed to justice.

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

Crisis: Dignitas: The Manners of Humility by Fr. George W. Rutler