By Syed Saleem Shahzad
Al-Qaeda's harrowing experiences after its retreat from Afghanistan in 2001 and during military operations in the Pakistani tribal areas of Waziristan cost it hundreds of arrests and casualties.
As a result, al-Qaeda reformed its tunnel vision and concluded that it should concentrate fighters in small pockets to establish tiny "kingdoms of heaven" all over the Islamic world, instead of becoming involved in global fights against US targets.
The strategy finally began to pay off in 2006 in Afghanistan and Iraq, where leading amirs (commanders) are in place, although the losses of foreign forces are fewer than al-Qaeda might have expected. This process, therefore, is still in the phase of implementation.
Crucially, though, al-Qaeda has evolved from an "idea" with a small group of followers into a tangible physical entity, especially in Iraq, where the resistance is on course to be fully taken over by al-Qaeda. The execution of Saddam Hussein will help al-Qaeda become the unifying force of all Iraqi warring segments, very much like the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Using Afghanistan and Iraq as springboards, al-Qaeda aims to unite all ideological allies under one strategic platform where their thoughts become al-Qaeda's. This, it is believed, will give them the courage to face down the "demon" US war machine that has kept them cowed in the past. The example is the new-found harmony between Pashtun tribes and the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda and Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq.
Al-Qaeda has targeted what it sees as the repugnant association of ruling establishments and Islamists in Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. These will be the new and broader fronts of wars fought under a structured al-Qaeda command.
No comments:
Post a Comment