Michael Perry:

The subtitle of my book The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford, 1998) is "Four Inquiries". Four inquiries, four chapters. The title of the fourth chapter: "Are Human Rights Absolute? The Incommensurability Thesis and Related Matters". In that chapter, I comment at length on, and explain why I am skeptical about, John Finnis' position regarding moral "absolutes": determinate moral norms that are exceptionless (unconditional). I hope MOJ readers who are interested in pursuing the issue will take a look at what I have to say in chapter 4 (pp. 87-106)--and, if they are at all inclined, let me know where, in their judgment, my argument misfires.

No absolute or exceptionless moral norms? How is this harmonious with orthodoxy?

Robert George's response to Mr. Perry's previous post. So adhering to one absolute is sufficient to make one not a moral relativist? "It boggles the mind." Mr. Perry's profile at MOJ.

Will the crisis be fixed pass when the old guard (of heterodoxy) finally passes?