Andrew Bacevich in SF

I should have attempted to brighten the photo before uploading it. Oh well.

One of the advantages of being underemployed is that I can attend events such as Dr. Bacevich's lecture in San Francisco last week. Young people have the excuse that they are working for not attending. But what if they weren't? There was one Asian in his 30s or 40s. The rest were 50 or above -- lots of seniors. By the time the room filled up, there were may be 3 or 4 people under the age of 30. (Including several Asian women.)

Looking at the elderly surrounding me, I was struck with the thought that they should be respected because they have at least more experience, if not actual wisdom. Conversing with the old is one of the simple joys of life. They probably can also teach some us useful things, even if they are unable to guide us in living. (This may not be the case with those who come after the Boomers, as we continue to lose practical skills.)

It's funny, both the Commonwealth Club and the WAC had posters advertising trips and cruises. I suppose such travel services target the senior citizens who frequent their events?

Dr. Bacevich was introduced by Ralph Kuiper, who told us about the WAC's weekly radio broadcast on KQED on Monday. He then told us to check the audio and video archive at the WAC's website. I learned that Professor Bacevich received his PhD from Princeton in American Diplomatic History. I also noted the WAC branding present on the wall hanging behind the stage. It's something everyone who has the money does these days when they filming speakers.

The good professor wanted to spend 18 to 20 minutes summarizing the argument of his most recent book, Washington Rules. The rest of the time would be devoted to answering questions from the audience. He started off by asking two questions: "Why are we in Afghanistan?" and "Why were we in Vietnam?" (the latter being an important question for his generation, especially since he was a soldier in Vietnam). There is a single answer to both questions: Washington adheres to the National Security Consensus or pattern of behavior that no longer works. These are the Washington Rules. Bacevich belives that alternatives do exist to the status quo.


There are two elements to the consensus:

1. The claim about what the US is called upon to do. This is the American credo - the US alone has the responsibility and obligation to lead, shape, save, liberate, and transform the world.
2. The Sacred Trinity: our understanding of military power and its application to the pursuit of the American credo.
1. The U.S. alone needs to maintain a global military presence.
2. The U.S. ought to configure forces not to defend America but to make available instruments of global  power projection.
3. The global military presence and global power projection capabilities serve as the foundation of global interventionism. (1) and (2) govern the policy of the "American Century."

The credo justifies the Trinity's vast requirements and exertions.

Dr. Bacevich noted his use of religious language, and explained why (probably only half-jokingly?). "I'm a conservative Catholic, and I want to bring all of you to the bishop of Rome." His actual explanation is this: he wanted to make the point that there is no empirical evidence to support the claims of the National Security Consensus -- it is a great matter of faith. The problem is that the rules do not work but are counterproductive (and this has been manifestly the case since 9/11). Permanent war in service to the American way of life will lead to bankruptcy, both fiscal, and more importantly, moral.

What should replace the Washington rules? An alternative credo: we need to revive the conviction that America's purpose and primary obligation is to be America. We should fulfill the aspirations of the founding documents. He then read the Preamble to the Constitution, focusing on "securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." We should be focusing our attention on Cleveland and Detroit, not Iraq and Afghanistan, and our obligations to our posterity, rather than placing an unjust burden upon them for our actions.

Now, someone may ask, why should this be an "either/or" situation. Can't we help Cleveland and Detroit and do good work overseas? Bacevich makes it clear that he is not endorsing some form of isolationism, Fortress America,  or pacifism or abolishing of the military. If in the course of fulfilling our ideals we serve as an exemplar to others, that's great. We should manifest the value of liberal values, and if others follow our example, that's all to the good. But we should not confuse these side benefits with our primary obligation and purpose.

As for our military forces, Bacevich proposes an alternative trinity.

1. The primary duty station is America. He concedes that there will be circumstances that require us to deploy troops elsewhere to accomplish certain purposes. But to deploy in perpetuity is absurd. (The example of US troops in Germany.)
2. The military is not for global power projection but to defend the US and its vital interests. He admits that "vital interests" potentiially opens a big great door. It could be defined in such an elastic way that it includes anything. "Vital interest" can be abused. But democratic politics should enable us to have a debate over what constitutes the US's vital interest.
3. We ought to use force in a way that is consistent with the just war tradition. (When is the use of force morally justified?) He believes that adherence to the just war tradition is useful for both moral and pragmatic thinking (the political consequences). Force should be used only as a last resource and in self-defense. He criticized the Bush doctrine of preemptive war; he also argued that the costs and consequences of our overseas interventions are more than one anticipates.

How likely will we see a departure from the Washington Rules? Bacevich believes that it is not likely. Why is that? 2 reasons.

1. Despite the fact that the Washington Rules don't work, D.C. is heavily invested in the status quo, which delivers formidable, substantive goods to D.C., profit for the MIC, justification for the National Security State, its budgets and prerogatives. The Rules enable ambitious people to exercise great authority and to imagine that they have a seat in shaping world history. This penchant for the Washington Rules pervades even the MSM. Journalists see wars as a way to furthering their careers. To think that a challenge to the Washington Rules could originate from D.C. is a fairly idle thought.
2. Having been conditioned so long to believe there is no alternative to the credo and the trinity, we have become excessively deferential to D.C. in terms of foreign policy. There is a failure of us to ask first order questions about US foreign policy. Until we recover that capacity, D.C. will continue to get its way and not stop.

That was the end of his presentation, and Dr. Bacevich went on to answer some audience questions.

Someone mentioned the NY Times article telling us Gen. Petraeus opposed a rapid withdrawal. Afghanistan looks like it might be the 21st century's South Korea -- there will be US presence in Afghanistan for decades.
Dr. Bacevich told us that he got up in Portland at 4:15 and glanced at the NY Times briefly. He noted that Gen. Petraeus was about to launch a media offensive in order to lead the charge in an effort to gain more time for the counterinsurgency strategy to work. Bacevich has an interest in civil-military relations, and if we have substantive civilian control in D.C., why is a theater commander taking it upon himself to lead the media offensive? What authority does he have to iossue a statement about how much time the C-in-C will allot to the mission?

Bacevich believes that creating effective, national Afghan institutions will not be done by July 2011. Officers who are making the pitch should be silent, as the argument presumes Afghanistan is a vital interest of the U.S.--to pacify the country, build the nation, make enormous gain against the threat posed by global anti-American jihadism. Bacevich asks how grave the threat is. The threat is not situated/headquartered in Afghanistan but is a transnational one. Strategically the rationale for Afghanistan doesn't make sense.

Does Afghanistan make sense in the light of regional concerns, for example, with respect to Pakistan?
Is this a reason to remain Afghanistan? Bacevich said that Pakistan would make for an interesting discussion. Its fate probably qualifies as a vital interest, but do we have the capacity to affect its future? Bacevich thinks no. Regarding the Af-Pak relationship, he asks, "Has perpetuating the U.S./Western war in Afghanistan contributed/will it contribute to Pakistan's stability?" We have been in Afghanistan for 9 years. Has Pakistan become more stable or less stable? How do our real concerns about Pakistan = staying the course of the war in Afghanistan?

The impact of the current economic crisis, peak oil, Middle East and Israel, natural resources, and China on the Washington Rules?
1. Economics. The Washington Rules were forged in the wake of World War 2. He is willing to admit that they kinda made sense in the late 1940s. The Cold War was a rich, creative movement in American statecraft. Our actions did contribute to our safety and well-being. But the Washington Rules reflected a set of conditions that existed at that time. (I think this compares with the assessment put forth by paleos.)

World War 2 depleted the world of great powers, except the US and the Soviet Union. We alone came out stronger, and this contributed to a distortion in our view of this chapter of world history. WW2 was a good news story for us - per capita GDP doubled. The allies needed our protection and assistance and we had the resources to do so. That world does not exist any longer. We have no $, we don't make stuff (though we continue to buy it, even though we can't afford it). The change in economic position needs to factor into our strategic thinking. We need to learn to live within our means, recognize the limits of our power and reach.

2. Israel. There is no question about Israel's right to exist. Bacevich said that the West (Christendom) has a deep-seated moral responsibility with respect to the survival of the Jewish state (our history of anti-semitism). But the obligation cannot extend to the point where the Israeli government acts in ways at odds with our own well-being (Israel's nuke arsenal, support for settlements in the occupied territories). There comes a time when it is necessary for us to say "Do what you need to do to advance security, but don't expect we'll turn a blind eye to it." A possible break in diplomatic relationships?

3. Oil. Some have said that the Iraq War was "just for oil" - oil profits for the administration. Bacevich thinks this is unfair of Bush (who believed himself to be a patriot) but it is not devoid of truth. The American way of life is dependent upon abundant and cheap fuel. The availability of mobility is something we take for granted. (Professor Bacevich pointed at himself, since he is able to go on this book tour lasting several weeks, traveling to various cities around the country.) We need to confront the tension between the freedom defined in that way and other vital interests. We need to learn to live within our means, and have a a sensible national policy. Even if the Iraq War was for the sake of oil, the larger pattern of American involvement is because of oil in the Middle East.

It is a cause of dysfunction and embedded are troubling moral questions.

4. China.Proponents of the Washington Rules tend to argue that the National Security Consensus needs to be sustained because of a potential conflict with China. This may lead to a self-fulfilling policy, but it is not a necessary one. He admits that he is not that familiar with China. But it seems to him that China's aspirations does not include the global imposition of Chinese values. We are the ones who believe this, and that absent this, we'll feel unsafe and vulnerable. We think our values are universal and should apply and prevail everywhere. Nothing mandates we be on a collision course with China. The question of the 21st century is, "What does China want?" To get rich, command respect, call shots in its own neighborhood. (The latter is especially something we demand for ourselves.)

The China-US relationship might be manageable -- there will be tension and friction, but it doesn't have to be like the US-USSR, which was the defining aspect of international relations in the latter half of the last century.

Is there something in the American psyche that needs to be addressed?
Bacevich is not optimistic about what we could pursue or the likelihood of real change. We are conditioned to accept it as uncontroversial that there are US forces in Germany 60 years after WW2. He has 2 unemployed daughters and he understands that families have everyday life to deal with. Life is tough, raising your kids, dealing with the routine tragedies of life. Someone asked him at his last appearance, "Who comes to your talks?" He said, "People like me." People who are more or less of his age, station in life, are doing ok.

There may be some reason for hope/optimism--he has received e-mails from military officers who agree with him, or ask him to elaborate on some question. There seems to be a growing awareness in the officer corps that this isn't working. If this cateches hold, it could be a powerful source of change. Instead of Petraeus, we have officers who are vocal that it is not in the Army's interest or the country's interest. This is not to say that they become a lobby. But rethinking within the officer corps could lead to an American public becoming more educated, and maybe our leaders will get the hint.

Advice to Obama?
Obama (campaign and since entering the White House): preoccupation with Afghanistan but it is not the core.
He should have first evaluated the threat of violent Islamic jihadism. (Bacevich: not a big threat.) Obama should have focused on the strategy dealing with the problem, then look at Afghanistan and how it fits in revised strategy.

We need to realistically evaluate a threat; there may be other means than protracted war to deal with the threat.

The war in Afghanistan is irrelevant and counterproductive.


He mentioned the Time cover with the photo of the mutilated Afghan girl. What is our moral obligation to the Afhgan people? What is our moral obligation to the Afghan people? People claim that we should be there because we have a moral obligation to the Afghan people. Dr. Bacevich responded by saying this is a serious consideration, one that requires a serious and thoughtful response. What is the most effective way to meet one's obligation? Is it to continue an ill-advised war? He asks three questions:

1. With respect to our moral obligations, why do Afghans come first? Bacevich asserted that we have a more pressing obligation to Mexico, given our demand for drugs and our gun laws, both of which contribute to the violence in Mexico. (I'd like to see him back up the claim about the gun laws, since it is used by liberals and anti-gun activists while others have claimed that most of the guns used by the cartels originate in the Mexican military.) He reminded us that in our two-century long history with Mexico we haven't done many positive things for that country.

2. If the Afghan people come first, why is war the best way to acquit our obligation? Does it benefit the Afghan people? With respect to the oppressed Afghan women, maybe we should give them sanctuary. 1/2 million to this country. How many of the humanitarians would accept that?

3. If perpetuation of war is the best way, then why don't you and I as citizens contribute. The burden of service falls on 0.5% of the population. The burden of paying is imposed on others (future generations) by our going into debt. We should bear the burden if this is really the case, send our kids, pay more taxes, get less social security.

Bacevich desn't take moral obligation lightly but "it sticks in my craw" that people are fine sending someone else's kid to do his 5th combat tour so their conscience can be eased.

The representative from Book, Inc. was crying as he talked about this -- was she thinking of his family's loss?

Vietnam: Lessons unlearned and forgotten?
What has lead to the amnesia. Bacevich said that he, like many others of his generation, used to think that this was a pivotal moment in US history, what came after was radically changed from what came before. This was a complete misperception. The impact on national security policy? None. (Reagan, 1st Iraq War -- Vietnam syndrome vanishes? No, people devoted to Washington Rules, the National Security Consensus were committed to shaping the lessons that we learned from Vietnam with the consensus. Bacevich cited the creation of study groups after the war, and their agenda.


Some notes:
During the book-signing, the gentleman in line before me asked if reinstating the draft would prevent the US from engaging in perpetual war. Dr. Bacevich said it would, but it's not going to happen--"the kids don't want it, the kids' parents don't want it, the generals don't want it."

Afterwards I asked the professor to clarify what he meant by "liberal" values. Might not liberalism (and the focus on the autnomous individual), as opposed to some form of communitarianism, be an obstacle to change? Dr. Bacevich responded by saying that he was referring to modern liberalism, not classical liberalism. "I'm conservative, not libertarian." He believes that government action is necessary to promote well-being, and the modern liberal state is necessitated by its size and present conditions. "That's just the way it is." I should have asked him to clarify -- it seems that he is saying that the modern liberal state is not necessary in and of itself, but because there is no solution, but it would be good to get some confirmation.

How would he follow up to this objection: what if this political order isn't sustainable (setting aside the question of the welfare state's effect on moral development and responsibility)? And does it not usurp the powers that are proper to the states?


But I wonder if there isn't more to the liberal values that he thinks we should be exemplifying than those of modern liberalism. He may be representative of a realist foreign policy, and have much in common with paleoconservatives in that regard, but what does he think of the proposition nation? What does he think the Founding Fathers really intended, and does it matter to his constitutional theory? Dr. Bacevich may appeal to our founding documents (as he does in The Limits of Power), but he also seems to believe that the Declaration of Independence, containing fundamental statements about our rights and political beliefs, was rightly used as a corrective to the Constitution with regard to voting (The Limits of Power, 25). (What else besides voting? Slavery, and so on.) Who else shares this notion, besides the Straussians? Other liberals, both classical and modern. Even the more extreme leftists might be able to do this and justify radical egalitarianism, socialism, and so on. If the Constitution has failed to protect us with respect to our foreign policy, then might it not have failed us with respect to our domestic policy (and how the National Government conducts and views itself)? A clearer statement of what Dr. Bacevich thinks about the American founding and the Constitution would be helpful. I think the Constitutional order is mostly gone and will not be restored without a collapse of the National Government happening, along with other events.



I wish I could have had the opportunity to talk to him about his Catholicism.


Some other thoughts from this day:
Not wanting to be stuck with paying for parking in downtown San Francisco, I took BART from San Bruno into the city. I couldn't help but think that BART was relic of 70s, as the appearance of its trains and stations were stuck in that period. There is a shot of a train and a station in the Planet of the Apes TV series. (The set was rather cheap, as the train was not even on a set of tracks.) Then there is the computer voice of automated announcements, which sounds like it's from the late 70s or early 80s. (It could be older than that, but it reminded me of the voice software to which I was exposed during the 80s.)

It seems to me that there is such a thing as classic, timeless beauty in such things, even if it is of a certain historical period because the beauty stands out. But the appearance of plain modernist style is just dated.

Naturally, I had to get some of Dr. Bacevich's books so he could sign them. (I probably should have gotten The New American Militarism, since it is a bigger book and more scholarly.) Is this the cult of personality? I would like to think there is something more substantial -- respect for and admiration of a scholar, teacher, soldier, elder. There sense of touch, actually making physical contact with someone, to establish a physical rapport. Tactile contact is so important for infant development -- babies use this sense as much as sight, if not more, and it seems to be more important than sight for bonding with their parents. Getting an autograph is having a trace, a remnant of someone's presence.



Started on August 13.

De Regno
Rangers