Recalling what Aristotle writes about community in Politics III.3 and III.9....
The doctrinaire liberal has no problem with the immigration of members of other peoples who have a different culture, because he doesn't have to live with them, and he doesn't care about community life. In the liberal model for understanding the origin of society (and government), individuals (or families) associate for the sake of the necessities of life, especially the protection of life and property. Living in society is desirable in so far as society enables them to more easily secure their private good. Liberal thinkers neglect an important good, namely the good of friendship. They may admit that men and women form families, but they ignore the good of friendship as it exists between members of a political community. (Not all of which are reducible to friendship between family members.)
Liberals presume that there are universal moral norms which govern how individuals behave towards one another, defending some notion of justice and right. (A "thin" sense of culture, as it were.) But is there anything more to morality than this? No. Society and government are for the sake of promoting the good of the individual, and the individual can determine what this is for himself, so long as he does not harm anyone else without their consent or infringe on their rights. Hence the laws that liberals support may not be sufficient for promoting what is necessary for people to live together well. Liberals also have no sense of custom as unwritten law, and would probably be opposed to such a notion on principle.
(The notion of a common good that liberals subscribe to is either the instrumental one or the aggregate one. The personalistic account of the common good comes dangerously close to being the same as the liberal one, if its definitions are not careful and do not take into account man's social nature.)
Written human laws constitute only a small part of the culture of a society, which includes all that orders society, even if our knowledge of unwritten mores shrinks with every generation. Moreover, a culture will differ in accordance with the constitution of the polity. Though admittedly the days of republican America are probably behind us.
The typical well-off American doesn't care about immigration, since he doesn't have to have immigrants as neighbors, or associate with them, really. Interracial marriage is often frowned upon, though they'd be loathe to admit it. Because these Americans live in isolation from their own neighbors, as well as from people who are ethnically different, they do not care about the vast array of informal laws and customs that govern behavior in any society. Life in community has very little meaning for them.
These intellectual error of liberals may also be combined with those of the (dogmatic) multiculturalist who either embraces diversity for its own sake, or sees Western culture as being inferior to non-Western cultures. Then you add to this mix the error of the will, the "do-gooder" mentality of the liberal who does not recognize an order in charity and whose loves reflect the belief that there is no difference whatsoever between the citizen and the non-citizen.
Even if a polity doesn't have the same sort of physical mobility and lack of rootedness that characterizes American culture, it may experience social fragmentation and loss of culture because of its inordinate size. (Plus the other historical factors that lead to the destruction of local communities.)
Edit. Mark Richardson has some complementary thoughts in his look at Sweden in Identity lite.
Notes:
Althusius, in his Politica, follows Aristotle closely on the ends of society, though it is not clear to me that he discusses civic friendship enough. John C. Calhoun's Disquisition on Government agrees with Aristotle as well, though he seems to offer a more "Augustinian" reason on why government is necessary?
In order to have a clear and just conception of the nature and object of government, it is indispensable to understand correctly what that constitution or law of our nature is, in which government originates; or, to express it more fully and accurately — that law, without which government would not, and with which, it must necessarily exist. Without this, it is as impossible to lay any solid foundation for the science of government, as it would be to lay one for that of astronomy, without a like understanding of that constitution or law of the material world, according to which the several bodies composing the solar system mutually act on each other, and by which they are kept in their respective spheres. The first question, accordingly, to be considered is — What is that constitution or law of our nature, without which government would not exist, and with which its existence is necessary?
In considering this, I assume, as an incontestable fact, that man is so constituted as to be a social being. His inclinations and wants, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to associate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in any age or country, in any state other than the social. In no other, indeed, could he exist; and in no other — were it possible for him to exist — could he attain to a full development of his moral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself, in the scale of being, much above the level of the brute creation.
I next assume, also, as a fact not less incontestable, that, while man is so constituted as to make the social state necessary to his existence and the full development of his faculties, this state itself cannot exist without government. The assumption rests on universal experience. In no age or country has any society or community ever been found, whether enlightened or savage, without government of some description.
Having assumed these, as unquestionable phenomena of our nature, I shall, without further remark, proceed to the investigation of the primary and important question — What is that constitution of our nature, which, while it impels man to associate with his kind, renders it impossible for society to exist without government?
The answer will be found in the fact (not less incontestable than either of the others) that, while man is created for the social state, and is accordingly so formed as to feel what affects others, as well as what affects himself, he is, at the same time, so constituted as to feel more intensely what affects him directly, than what affects him indirectly though others; or, to express it differently, he is so constituted, that his direct or individual affections are stronger than his sympathetic or social feelings. I intentionally avoid the expression, selfish feelings, as applicable to the former; because, as commonly used, it implies an unusual excess of the individual over the social feelings, in the person to whom it is applied; and, consequently, something depraved and vicious. My object is, to exclude such inference, and to restrict the inquiry exclusively to facts in their bearings on the subject under consideration, viewed as mere phenomena appertaining to our nature — constituted as it is; and which are as unquestionable as is that of gravitation, or any other phenomenon of the material world.
In asserting that our individual are stronger than our social feelings, it is not intended to deny that there are instances, growing out of peculiar relations — as that of a mother and her infant — or resulting from the force of education and habit over peculiar constitutions, in which the latter have overpowered the former; but these instances are few, and always regarded as something extraordinary. The deep impression they make, whenever they occur, is the strongest proof that they are regarded as exceptions to some general and well understood law of our nature; just as some of the minor powers of the material world are apparently to gravitation.
I might go farther, and assert this to be a phenomenon, not of our nature only, but of all animated existence, throughout its entire range, so far as our knowledge extends. It would, indeed, seem to be essentially connected with the great law of self-preservation which pervades all that feels, from man down to the lowest and most insignificant reptile or insect. In none is it stronger than in man. His social feelings may, indeed, in a state of safety and abundance, combined with high intellectual and moral culture, acquire great expansion and force; but not so great as to overpower this all-pervading and essential law of animated existence.
But that constitution of our nature which makes us feel more intensely what affects us directly than what affects us indirectly through others, necessarily leads to conflict between individuals. Each, in consequence, has a greater regard for his own safety or happiness, than for the safety or happiness of others; and, where these come in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own. And hence, the tendency to a universal state of conflict, between individual and individual; accompanied by the connected passions of suspicion, jealousy, anger and revenge — followed by insolence, fraud and cruelty — and, if not prevented by some controlling power, ending in a state of universal discord and confusion, destructive of the social state and the ends for which it is ordained. This controlling power, wherever vested, or by whomsoever exercised, is GOVERNMENT.
More on identity:
The role of affections: identity not merely "rational" or "credal" -- what one thinks or believes. Identity is also defined by one's social relations and bonds.
IEP: Political Philosophy, Liberalism
CE: Liberalism
Begun on July 2.
