Thumos

This was posted over at Amerika: Men Without Chests. As it discusses thumos in conneftion with Plato, I was reminded of Plato's predecessors. (MacInityre should still be reliable as a historian of ancient Greek ethics?) It seems to be another post-Christian article -- the author is seeking to recover a pre-Christian account of virtue through Francis Fukuyama: "Much of the book revolves around thymos, Plato’s spirited part of the soul that yearns for honor and recognition.  Thymos can then be divided into two:  megalothymia as the need to be recognized as superior to others, and isothymia as the need to be recognized as merely equal to others." Perhaps the author is not aware of the Christian tradition's treatment of the virtues. (Did the Franciscan school ever discuss the cardinal virtues to the same extent as Aquinas?)

According to the author, liberal society seeks to do away with distinctions; the rationale for megalothymia is thereby eliminated.

When you subdue megalothymia, you subdue pride, when you subdue pride, you subdue shame, when you subdue both shame and pride, you throw out spirit.  When you throw out spirit, you are left with “last men.”

What of Christian humility? But here pride may name something other than the vice opposed to humility - having the correct assessment of one's self and abilities and to what one is thereby entitled.

Thumos refers to the spirited part of man that enables him to overcome difficulties or obstacles or fear. There is a place for thumos in Christian moral theology, in the virtue of fortitude or courage. It is also tied to the desire for honors, as we see in St. Thomas's account of magnanimity. We can have a proper desire for honors without going to a pagan excess. But another problem which the article brings up is the emasculation of American (Western?) men. It is necessary to suppress men in order to preserve the political order from internal threats and also to create wage slaves for the economy. How should we character deformation that results from the education proper to such an order?

Magnanimity is concerned with great honors. What virtue is concerned with ordinary honors? St. Thomas writes:

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are philotimia, i.e. love of honor, and aphilotimia, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. 

While this virtue has no name, it nonetheless is important for men for daily life. It may have no name  beecause it is so obvious or because most men had it, and it seems almost natural, like confidence or self-assuredness. But the virtue is not mere natural disposition; a virtue is required to mediate reason and emotion. Is there something akin to pusillanimity with respect to ordinary difficulties (talking to a woman, for example), a virtue opposed to "confidence" other than aphilotimia? It seems that what we really want to look at is not the virtue concerned with ordinary honors, but the virtue concerned with ordinary difficulties, something "lesser" than the virtue of fortitude. Confidence or self-assuredness deals with the fear of failure; it is connected to self-assertiveness (not being afraid to speak one's mind because of the possible consequences, particularly social consequences like ostracization, or the loss of one's job). It is not identical to self-assertiveness. Of course, a man be assertive for other reasons, for example, anger.

Should we attempt to understand the virtues dealing with fear as being differentiated by degrees? That is to say we should also take into consideration the subjective condition of the man, so that what may be an ordinary difficulty for one may be a great difficulty for another? Or should we classify the virtues instead based on the kinds of difficulties? The latter is the proper approach. We can look at the fears and difficulties related to the social life and interacting others, dangers that do not affect the body but some other aspect of the person. (Acting out of fear is not the same as acting out of prudence.)

What we Christians need to recover is not pagan morality, even the best of pagan morality, but the best of Christian moral theology which can teach a man how to live his vocation well. At the same time, we should not shun the use of classical sources which have contributed to the development of the Western tradition, or any other material which may be useful. Christians do have something to say to American men about living well. (Although "Game" has yet to be fully "translated" into traditional Christian ethics, there are both virtues that a man needs to relate to a woman specifically as a woman. Plus general precepts he should follow?)

We can look at the ordinary honors we pursue are meaningless some other time.